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Executive Summary 
When the UK Government published its energy White Paper in February 2003 there was no 
imminent prospect of a decision on building new nuclear power stations.  Since that time, a 
range of factors has led to an intensification of the debate about nuclear power. Government 
has now announced a major new energy review in 2006 in which nuclear power will be a 
significant subject.   
However, uncertainties about the costs of future nuclear generation have not materially 
reduced.  Important examples are: 
§ neither of the two main potentially competing designs of reactor have yet been built 
anywhere in the world and recent international experience of nuclear ordering offers few 
direct lessons for the UK; 
§ the UK safety licensing system has yet to give serious consideration to either design; 
§ the UK’s history in building nuclear projects and some other large infrastructure has been 
poor.  While there are solid grounds for expecting that future construction would be less 
costly, ‘appraisal optimism’ remains a real risk. 
Nuclear power gives rise to major externalities (impacts not captured, or borne, by producers 
or consumers).  Positively, greenhouse gas emissions are reduced and security of supply 
may be enhanced.  Negatively, there are short and long-term risks of radiation release and 
also proliferation issues.  Valuation of these effects is problematic and only in the case of 
greenhouse gas emissions saved is useful valuation even likely.  However, we do not draw 
on any such estimates in this paper, concentrating instead on the direct costs of nuclear 
power.   
The overwhelmingly important element in the total costs of nuclear power is the cost of 
construction (capital cost), the temporal component of which is a significant determining 
factor.  This typically accounts for some 60% to 75% of the generating cost of nuclear power.  
Other elements of nuclear cost are either subject to limited uncertainty - operating 
performance, the cost of fuel and operations and maintenance (O&M) - or are potentially 
manageable even at low rates of discounting the future - waste and decommissioning.   
Only two reactor types, the BNFL/Westinghouse AP1000 and the Areva/Framatome/ 
Siemens EPR, seem likely to compete in any future UK market.   Finland started building the 
world’s first EPR in late summer 2005, and no AP construction has yet started.   
There are few sources of data on the costs of future nuclear power that relate directly to UK 
circumstances.  The more minor components of cost, especially fuel, O&M and operating 
performance, can be forecast with a relatively narrow margin of uncertainty.  This is either 
because of recent real-world concrete experience in the UK and elsewhere or because 
market structures and resource availability are well-established and stable.  The various 
studies consulted would suggest aggregate figures for fuel and O&M costs for future UK 
reactors would probably be in a range of 0.65p/kWh to 0.85p/kWh. Operating availability of 
85% would also seem reasonably probable. 
The problematic category is capital costs, where there is no recent European or North 
American experience.  Examination of the limited number of published capital cost estimates 
that apply directly to the UK shows that all appear to derive from studies originally designed 
to apply to other countries and from vendors of reactor systems.  This limits the confidence 
that can be placed in such figures for the following principal reasons: 
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§ overseas-based cost numbers do not easily translate into reliable UK cost number due to 
a range of factors, including exchange rate problems, the existence across countries of 
different regulatory systems, and differences in industrial and labour market structures; 
§ the expected cost of reactors depends very much on whether a single reactor is being 
considered or a programme of essentially identical reactors.  Programmes, typically of 
eight or ten reactors, should offer significantly lower unit cost, but for such savings to be 
realised, an up-front commitment to the programme would be needed; and 
§ vendors of reactor systems have a clear market incentive, especially ahead of 
contractual commitments, towards ‘appraisal optimism’ - in other words to under-
estimate costs.  This means that the risks attached to cost estimates are ‘asymmetrical’ - 
the chances of actual costs turning out to be higher than forecast costs are much higher 
than actual costs turning out to be lower. 
The consortium building the Finnish reactor contract has offered a turnkey (fixed price) 
contract.  If such a contractual structure were used in the UK, it might seem to offer reduced 
cost uncertainty.  However it is not clear that vendors would offer to fix all costs, and while 
they would be absorbing most of the risks, they would not necessarily reduce them.  There is 
not yet any way of pinning down a realistic capital cost estimate for new reactors in the UK: 
we can get some idea of the minimum cost, but significantly higher costs are possible, and 
costs remain subject to major uncertainty.   
Internationally, 24 reactors are under construction.  Of these, 13 use designs that would be 
unambiguously out of contention for future UK use (mainly Russian designs and Indian 
adaptations of foreign designs) and a further ten use designs that will have real difficulty in 
competing in the UK (boiling water reactors and heavy water reactors).  This makes the 
relevance of overseas experience limited.  Some data are available in relation to the recent 
decision in Finland to build an EPR, but this is at an aggregative level, and the nature of the 
apparently fixed price contract is not public.  China has built recent nuclear plants and has 
two currently on order, and the Chinese Government has announced an intention to build up 
to 30 more in the relatively near future.  The cost data relating to the Chinese reactors are of 
very limited relevance to the UK.   
It seems improbable that a UK Government would directly finance all or a large part of a 
nuclear reactor project or programme.  The private sector would need to take the lead and 
either corporate finance or project finance would be possibilities: the latter is complex but 
perhaps the more probable.  Government assistance in some form would, however, almost 
certainly be needed, and could take several forms, for example government guarantees of 
bank or bond financing, tax allowances, and grants (probably financed by consumers) for a 
range of costs.  A low carbon obligation could be imposed on electricity suppliers, requiring 
them to source a specified proportion of their sales on renewables and nuclear power. Such 
a scheme could benefit from the experience of the former 'Non-fossil fuel obligation' which 
ran from 1990 to 1998 and could be seen as a major extension to the current Renewables 
Obligation on suppliers.  This might involve a fixed or minimum sale price for nuclear output 
over many years.  While back end costs (waste and decommissioning) are highly uncertain 
and could be substantial, financing these over the lifetime of a new plant at even a low rate 
of assumed fund accumulation would make such costs potentially quite small.   
Given the importance of capital costs, and the extent of uncertainties in such costs for 
nuclear power, one of the most important factors determining the generating cost of nuclear 
electricity is the cost of capital.  A good starting point for the cost of capital is the rate of 
return that the economic regulator Ofgem allows utilities to earn on regulated (low risk) 
assets.  This is currently 6.5% and it seems probable that a first-of-a-kind nuclear project 
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would require a premium of 2 to 3 percentage points above this.  This would imply a discount 
rate of around 9%, assuming that all other uncertainties (especially cost or time overruns) 
have already been allowed for elsewhere in the analysis. 
The combination of any new UK nuclear investment over the next few years and the 
retirement of old nuclear plant will mean that nuclear capacity would continue to be a 
baseload generator (running round the clock, all year).  This means that nuclear output will 
continue to attract relatively lower prices for its output than plants with more flexible 
operational characteristics.  In relation to current market rules, some of the public policy 
mechanisms already mentioned - for example, imposing obligations to buy nuclear output - 
would reduce market efficiency by creating distortions and would  also risk breaching 
European Commission rules on state aids, by placing nuclear plant in an unduly favourable 
commercial position. 
The ‘knock-on’ effects of a large (say ten unit) nuclear programme are difficult to gauge.  The 
appetite of the market for new gas-fired generation would probably reduce, as nuclear and 
gas-firing would be competing technologies for baseload power.  The impact on renewables 
investment is more difficult to determine in advance: much would depend on whether or not 
Government’s willingness to finance renewables was diminished by commitment to a nuclear 
programme and this is a political judgment.  It is also difficult to predict whether the private 
market’s appetite to invest in renewables would be affected.  Overall there is no basis for 
predicting the degree to which a nuclear programme would lead to ‘crowding out’ of 
investment in renewable energy. 
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1. Introduction 
This Report is submitted to the Sustainable Development Commission (SDC), jointly by 
NERA Economic Consulting (NERA) and SPRU – Science and Technology Policy Research 
- of the University of Sussex.  It is the final deliverable under a research project 
commissioned by the SDC to investigate the evidence on the costs of nuclear power 
generation.  
The contents of this report are as follows: 
§ Section 2 sets out the policy and market contexts in which the issue of nuclear power 
generation costs arises, and raises the issue of externalities; 
§ Section 3 provides a breakdown of the main components of electricity generation costs, 
and how, historically, these components differ in the case of nuclear compared to the 
other main forms of generation; 
§ Section 4 provides important background to the available sources of data, first by 
outlining the main reactor types, and then by summarising the main sources;  
§ Section 5 then sets out an analysis of the main sources of data on nuclear generation 
costs; 
§ Section 6 presents a review of the international evidence on recent experience with 
nuclear generation, first reviewing the current developments on a world-wide basis, and 
then focussing in more detail on the specific cases of Finland and China; and 
§ Section 7 then discusses potential financing mechanisms for new nuclear investment in 
the UK, and the electricity market issues that potentially arise. 
§ Section 8 includes a bibliography. 
In Appendix A we provide further detail on discounting and the costs of capital issue, and in 
Appendix B we provide a glossary of terms. 
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2. The Policy and Market Context 
As recently as February 2003, the Government’s White Paper on energy argued that nuclear 
power was an uneconomic option in then-current UK conditions1 and that this meant that no 
active consideration of new nuclear investment was needed.  There was no serious 
disagreement on this point in public debate at that time.  In the course of the last year or so, 
however, there has been major renewed interest in the prospects for new nuclear build in the 
UK.  This interest has been accompanied by a number of reports which appear to show that 
the economic status of nuclear power has improved.  The detail of recent reports on the 
economics of nuclear power is a main subject of this report.  But more broadly, there is the 
question of what it is that appears to account for the improved prospects of nuclear power.  
A number of factors can be identified: 
§ Fossil fuel prices, especially for oil and natural gas, have continued to rise and are 
currently at high levels.  Given that nuclear power would compete largely with gas-fired 
power, these price increases – if sustained over the next decade and more – would 
improve the relative position of nuclear power. 
§ Climate change mitigation remains an important political priority and there are increasing 
doubts that renewable energy and energy efficiency will have as much potential for 
reducing carbon emissions as the 2003 White Paper anticipated.  Two issues stand out: 
the recent rise, not fall, in annual carbon emissions; and the much-publicised concerns 
about local impacts, and hence problems in gaining planning approval for wind projects.  
§ For a variety of reasons, security of energy supply has become more prominent in the 
political debate on energy policy.  Contributory causes appear to be: concerns about the 
ability of both gas and electricity systems to meet winter peak demands; the increases in 
oil and gas prices already mentioned; and the realisation that gas and oil self-sufficiency 
are coming to an end, combined with concerns about the long-term reliability of major 
overseas sources of supply.  Security of supply is a complex and under-analysed subject, 
but to the extent that greater domestic self-sufficiency in energy is perceived as adding 
to security, nuclear power is potentially attractive. 
§ While as at 2003 no OECD Europe/North American country had ordered a new nuclear 
power plant for ten years, Finland committed to a new nuclear plant in 2004 and started 
construction in summer 2005.  France also made a decision in principle to order a new 
nuclear plant in 2005 and seems likely to go ahead with construction in 2006.  The new 
US Energy Policy Act has also made provision for substantial financial assistance for the 
first few nuclear units ordered there.  Nuclear investment has therefore become a reality 
again in other OECD countries, and this has prompted the idea that it could equally 
become reality here. 
However, the uncertainties surrounding potential nuclear investment in the UK have not 
been materially changed by these events and perceptions, and they remain very substantial.  
First, neither of the two main contending reactor designs in UK conditions – the 
Westinghouse-BNFL AP1000 and the Framatome/Areva EPR – has yet been built anywhere 
in the world2. While both of these designs incorporate only incremental changes to designs 
                                               
1  Department of Trade and Industry, Our energy future - creating a low carbon economy, TSO, February 2003, Page 76.. 
2    As we note in Chapter 4, there are in principle two other potential candidates, but we have discounted them for the 
 purposes of this analysis: 
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previously built (both are described by the industry as ‘evolutionary’) there are inevitably 
significant uncertainties involved because of the lack of any prior construction experience.  
The EPR has been chosen for both Finnish and French reactors, but it will be several years 
before these projects will significantly reduce uncertainties.   
A further specific uncertainty here is that the relevant UK safety regulator, the Nuclear 
Installations Inspectorate (the NII), has not yet started to consider safety cases for either of 
these designs.  When the NII considered the proposed design for the last UK reactor to be 
built (the Westinghouse PWR at Sizewell B) it required significant design changes that 
raised construction costs significantly.  The evolutionary AP design aims to be more 
passively safe than the Sizewell design while the EPR concentrates mainly on trying to gain 
economies of scale by increasing unit size. The AP1000 has recently received generic safety 
approval from the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).  These factors may possibly 
make new reactor designs less subject to cost-increasing safety modifications than was the 
case for Sizewell B, but by definition this remains unknown at present.   
Finally, the UK’s history of both nuclear construction and large projects in general has by 
international standards been poor.  This does not mean that a repeat of the Sizewell B 
experience is at all likely: Sizewell B has a total generating cost in today’s money of over 
6p/kWh3 and no-one expects anything as expensive on any future nuclear project.  There 
are several reasons to expect significant improvement, apart from the expectation that 
current reactor designs are expected to be simpler and require fewer material inputs and 
less on-site fabrication: 
§ Big-project management techniques have improved over the last fifteen years. 
§ There is likely to be a more competitive, international process for letting a nuclear 
construction contract. 
§ A consortium taking on a nuclear project would probably offer terms that are closer to a 
turnkey (fixed price) contract than the cost-plus contracts4 that were characteristic of past 
nuclear construction. 
As a future nuclear project would be in the private rather than the public sector, there is likely 
to be a closer fit between risk and consequence: in other words, the prime contractors will 
have better incentives to control costs because they will suffer greater consequences in 
profit terms if they fail to do so. 
                                                                                                                                                  
§ Japan is constructing versions of the BWR and PWR that derive from GE and Westinghouse respectively but have been 
adapted by Japanese licensees.  However, no Japanese manufacturer has ever tried to export its designs and this seems 
unlikely to change.  The Advanced Boiling Water Reactor, already built in Japan and under construction in Taiwan, 
could be a contender for UK orders, but BWRs have never been seriously considered in the UK since 1965.  Partly for 
the reason that BWRs tend to produce higher operator doses than other reactor types, it seems improbable that ABWRs 
would compete in the UK; 
§ The Candu heavy water reactor developed by AECL of Canada is often mentioned as a candidate for UK construction.  
However the design is significantly different from light water reactors (PWRs and BWRs) and the licensing process in 
the UK would probably be lengthy.  For this reason CANDUs are ‘outsiders’ in any future competitive process.  
3  Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU), The Energy Review, Cabinet Office 2002; Working Paper on the 
  Economics of Nuclear Power, Table 1, Page 6. 
4  A cost-plus contract means that the contractor can charge a client all costs incurred on a project plus a profit margin. 
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Vendors may be willing to sign more or less turnkey contracts for initial nuclear orders and 
this would offer some financial protection to utility purchasers of nuclear plant and their 
customers.  But a willingness to absorb some risks on the part of vendors seeking market 
entry does not necessarily reduce risks: it re-allocates them, but will only reduce them to the 
extent that management incentives are imposed and are effective.  And if the risks crystallise, 
vendors will not be willing to continue to absorb financial losses and would resort (as in the 
USA in the late 1960s and early 1970s, after similar early turnkey orders) to a more cost-plus 
contractual structure.   
‘Appraisal optimism’ has been characteristic of many ‘mega-projects’ in the UK and 
elsewhere and cost forecasts for nuclear projects have been among the most optimistic.  It is 
too early to be confident that such optimism has entirely dissipated even if private 
contractors may financially suffer the subsequent consequences of optimism more than their 
earlier public sector counterparts.  The uncertainties are especially acute as any nuclear 
project in the UK would, as things currently stand, probably involve the construction of a 
design yet to be built anywhere in the world.  This might not automatically lead to optimism, 
but given the commercial incentive for vendors to start creating a potentially large market 
which they would expect to be profitable in the longer term, optimism remains likely.   And 
various kinds of public intervention that might be necessary to induce private sector 
investment in nuclear power (including guarantees of one kind or another, see section 7.2 
below) could well weaken the link between optimism and consequential private sector 
financial loss.  In other words, appraisal optimism is still a significant risk for future UK 
nuclear projects.   
2.1. International ordering 
We deal with recent international ordering patterns in more detail in Section 6.2 below.  In 
summary however: 
§ Altogether 24 reactors are officially under current construction around the world, though 
only one of these, the Finnish EPR, uses a reactor design which is likely to be offered in 
the UK. 
§ In OECD Europe and North America, the only nuclear plant ordered in the last decade 
has been the Finnish EPR, on which construction started in late summer 2005.   
§ Nine of the 24 reactors were originally ordered before 1990, and are mostly of dated 
Russian design. 
§ The bulk of genuinely recent nuclear ordering has been in East and South Asia. The 
country with the largest and most consistent recent ‘programme’ is South Korea, using 
two main reactor types.  
§ China has ambitious plans (up to 30 reactors) for nuclear construction but currently only 
has two plants on order. 
§ India appears to have 8 plants being built (including 2 recent Russian-origin units) but 
there is some doubt about the commitment or capacity of India to complete these in a 
timely fashion. 
§ Commercial and regulatory considerations may rule that new nuclear power remains 
infeasible in the UK.  If it does prove to be commercially feasible there are very many 
impacts, beyond those of commercial profitability, which will bear upon its welfare impact 
on the nation (or the world) as a whole.  We list, in section 2.2, the most important 
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impacts, with a summary of the (very limited) extent to which we believe it is feasible to 
express each in monetary terms, and so incorporate quantitatively in “the cost of nuclear”. 
2.2. Clearly negative externalities 
Three well recognised negative externalities are: 
§ Risk of radiation release from the nuclear plant, following an accident or intentional 
damage; 
§ Risk of radiation release from the nuclear waste, in the medium or perhaps very long 
term;  
§ Potential transfer of technology to nuclear weapons production.  
These are all factors on which a considerable amount of quantitative and qualitative data is 
available, which needs to be considered by the government in weighing any policy decision 
about the acceptability of new nuclear generation.  However, while they are all different in 
kind, none appear to us to be suitable for expressing explicitly in monetary terms.   
Any increase in the prospective possible public sector financial commitment to waste storage 
that will arise from the new reactor should be valued as a cost to the economy, as should 
any other material public financial contribution to the plant.   
2.3. Clearly positive externalities 
Two well recognised positive externalities are: 
§ Reduced greenhouse gas emissions; 
§ Improved security of electricity supply. 
These again are factors on which much data is potentially available.  We doubt that it would 
be helpful to try to value improved security of supply explicitly in monetary terms.  It should 
however be practicable to value the impact of greenhouse gas emissions, using an estimate 
of the marginal cost of restraining emissions to meet future expected emissions targets (and 
subject to any possible impact on renewable energy sources, as noted in section 7.2.3 
below).  
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3. Components of Nuclear Power Costs 
The analysis which follows is concerned principally with the costs of nuclear power in the 
context of single stations.  In other words it does not consider any of the wider systemic 
costs that may be involved – for example the costs of connecting a nuclear station to the 
transmission network or the need, if a large unit is connected, for a minimum level of standby 
power to be available in case of a need to shut the plant down.  In practice, this will not 
significantly distort any of the results, and in any case the great bulk of data available is of 
the ‘single station’ type.   
The data we consider in this report generally contributes to an analysis of generating costs, 
generally expressed in terms of pence/kilowatt-hour or sometimes £/megawatt-hour.  We do 
not generally provide a translation of cost components into generating costs, though for any 
given discount rate or cost of capital it is usually possible to do so.  For example the 
assumptions used in the Royal Academy of Engineering report translate (at 7.5% discount 
rate) into a forecast generating cost of 2.2p/kWh for CCGTs, 2.3p/kWh for nuclear and 
higher numbers for wind power.5  Given the uncertainties attaching to the basic data that 
contributes to these calculations – the main subject of the present report – such apparently 
definitive numbers should be treated with caution in the case of UK nuclear power. 
A useful context for the presentation of nuclear power costs is an outline of the main cost 
components and their relative importance.  Costs for nuclear plant can be divided into four 
main components:  
§ construction or capital cost;  
§ fuel costs;  
§ operations and maintenance charges; and  
§ ‘back end’ costs for waste and decommissioning.   
The first three of these cost categories are common to all power plants.  The fourth, ‘back 
end’ costs are in principle applicable to all power plant types, but in practice are only of 
significance for nuclear plants.  In the nuclear case, such costs are handled differently in 
different analyses.  Sometimes, waste costs are included within fuel costs, as the bulk of 
wastes arise from spent fuel (especially if there is a ‘once-through’ fuel cycle).  In other 
cases, regulatory regimes insist that some or all back end costs – sometimes including 
waste costs - are covered by a segregated fund that the plant owner must build up to a 
specified level during the course of plant operation, and in these cases all back end costs 
may be identified separately.    
The proportion of generating costs (generally expressed in p/kWh) represented by each cost 
component for each technology will vary according to a range of factors.  In the nuclear case, 
expectations about the construction cost and the rate at which future costs and benefits are 
‘discounted’ plus assumptions about back end costs cause the greatest variations.  For 
fossil-fuel fired plant, where the cost of fuel is the dominant element, the cost components 
will vary according to expectations about future fuel prices.   
Table 3.1 below presents some typical cost proportions for three generating technologies. 
Combined cycle gas fired power plants are included because they have been the dominant 
                                               
5  Royal Academy of Engineering, The Costs of Generating Electricity, March 2004, page 8. 
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technological choice for private investors since privatisation of the British electricity system in 
1990.  Wind power is included because it is becoming the predominant renewable 
technology.  Table 3.1 assumes that the discount rate (reflecting a possible private sector 
cost of capital) is around 10% (real). 
Table 3.1 
Representative Proportions of Electricity Generating Costs (%) 
 Nuclear CCGT Renewable 
(wind) 
Construction or capital (including 
interest during construction) 
60-75 30-40 85-90 
Fuel 5-10 50-65 0 
O&M 8-15 5-10 5-15 
Back end * 0 0 
Source: adapted from International Energy Agency (2001) Nuclear Power in the OECD, Paris, p. 124  
The asterisk in Table 3.1 against ‘back end’ costs – waste and decommissioning – reflects a 
number of uncertainties.  First, costs are affected by the decision whether or not to 
reprocess spent fuel (its separation into plutonium, uranium and various waste streams), or 
alternatively to treat spent fuel as waste.  The UK and France have been historically 
committed to reprocessing as a matter of public policy, though there are no plans to 
reprocess spent fuel from Sizewell B.  It is now widely accepted that reprocessing adds 
significantly to costs – for instance an OECD study of 19946 suggested that reprocessing 
was at least twice as expensive as direct disposal of fuel.  It is widely assumed that any 
future reactors in the UK would therefore not reprocess their fuel.  Second, both 
decommissioning and especially waste management costs are highly uncertain because 
there is so little relevant commercial experience, and these costs could be high and stretch 
over hundreds of years.  Their importance within the overall generating cost will also vary 
substantially according to assumptions about the rate at which such back end costs should 
be discounted.  This means that it is difficult to give a representative figure for these back 
end costs.  We can however say that these costs are likely to be very small as a percentage 
of generation costs. 
There are many ways in which funding could be put in place for waste and decommissioning 
costs, including the possibility that substantial funds could be required at the start of the 
project – in other words an addition to capital cost.  However common practice for privately–
owned nuclear plants7 is to require plant owners to cover back end costs by setting up a 
segregated trust fund (to guarantee availability of money when required) and then to allow 
the fund to accumulate by annual contributions for at least the expected plant lifetime, often 
40 years.  Investing the fund in safe stocks (e.g. Government bonds) allows the fund to earn 
an annual return in the region of 3% in real terms.  However there is little international 
experience of commercial scale decommissioning and even less experience of ‘final’ costs 
                                               
6  OECD Nuclear Energy Agency   The economics of the nuclear fuel cycle, Paris 1994 
7  This is broadly the way in which British Energy were required to fund long-term decommissioning costs before the 
company got into financial difficulties.   
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for high and intermediate level waste. Past industry cost estimates in this area have tended 
to escalate steeply and could well do so again8.    
A calculation by BNFL in 2002 based on an expected decommissioning and waste cost of 
£365m yielded a cost of 0.014p/kWh at the conservative fund accumulation rate of 2% 
annually, or a contribution of well under 1% to total generating cost9.  Even if the BNFL 
estimates of decommissioning and waste costs were to escalate by a factor of ten in real 
terms, this would still mean that the back end would cost  around 0.14p/kWh and would 
contribute (all else equal) 5% of total generating cost.  Private investors might still require 
Government guarantees – for instance to put a cap on private liability for back end costs – 
but the significance of the back end for total generating costs will still be very substantially 
less than capital costs, which are discussed in the next paragraph. 
For nuclear power, construction or capital costs are the critical item because of their 
dominance – they are responsible for around two-thirds of generating cost.  In present 
circumstances, the importance of capital costs is made even greater because greater 
uncertainty attaches to capital items than to fuel and O&M.  There are two main reasons for 
this: 
1. There is substantial real-world, operating data on both fuel and O&M costs from existing 
reactors.  Fuel costs are low and stable: uranium is plentiful and the enrichment/fuel 
manufacturing industry is mature.  O&M costs vary more across countries (partly 
depending on regulatory needs and reactor reliability) but they have generally been 
falling and have become more predictable.  There are reasonable grounds for believing 
that both of these items are relatively stable and will take similar values in potential new 
reactors to those observed in currently operating plant; 
2. Conversely there is a complete absence of recent, real-world data on the capital costs of 
reactors of the kinds likely to compete in the UK.  Indeed no reactors of the type likely to 
compete in the UK have yet been built anywhere.  Such data as are available are from a 
very narrow range of primary sources and refer in all but one case to paper-based or 
feasibility studies.  Further, the history of cost estimation for large projects such as 
nuclear power stations is characterised by substantial optimism.    
One other relevant piece of data – operating performance of reactors – is important because 
it translates cost/kW into cost /kWh.  Good operating performance makes the capital cost per 
kWh low, and vice versa.  Recent experience in the UK, USA and through much of the world 
is that operating performance of reactors has improved in recent years and has become 
more stable.  It seems reasonable to expect that the designs of reactors that might compete 
in the UK will be able to reproduce the operating performance of most reactors in Europe 
and North America (around 85% availability or better).   
The clear implication of this analysis is that capital costs, and associated construction times, 
are by a long way the most important element in the generating costs of any future nuclear 
plant in the UK, and they receive correspondingly the greatest attention in the analysis below 
of other studies.    
                                               
8  M. Sadnicki and G. MacKerron Managing UK Nuclear Liabilities SPRU, University of Sussex, 1997, especially 
Chapter 5.     
9  K Hesketh, BNES Seminar Reactor Economics, BNFL Research and Technology, 15 May 2002 
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The level of uncertainty for CCGT and renewable costs is less than for nuclear.  For 
renewables, construction costs dominate and are fairly predictable for onshore wind due to 
significant recent experience.  For offshore wind and other renewables, more uncertainty 
attaches to construction costs and it is always necessary – to get specific generating costs - 
to know something about site characteristics.  For gas, fuel is the significant uncertainty as 
gas prices are uncertain in the future.   
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4. Data Sources and Quality 
4.1. Reactor types 
Before discussing data sources, it is worth briefly reviewing the types of reactor that might be 
built in the UK in the next few years.  As mentioned above, all but one of current worldwide 
nuclear orders use technology that is unlikely to be used in the UK.  It is worth noting that 
more radical reactor designs widely promoted by the nuclear industry in recent years – the 
most prominent of which is the small-scale Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) – are many 
years from being capable of feasible licensing and so are not considered in the analysis 
below.  
§ Seven current orders (two in China, two in India) use variants of a Russian WWER, 
pressurised water reactor design, and one in Russia uses the RBMK design, similar to 
Chernobyl.  There has never been an attempt to license Russian designs in OECD 
Europe or North America, and there is no expectation that any attempt will be made in 
the future.  The Argentine PHWR and Indian FBR designs are even more improbable. 
§ Japan is constructing versions of the BWR and PWR that derive from General Electric 
and Westinghouse respectively but have been adapted by Japanese licencees.  No 
Japanese manufacturer has ever tried to export its designs and this seems unlikely to 
change.  The Advanced Boiling Water Reactor, already built in Japan and under 
construction in Taiwan, could be a contender for UK orders, but BWRs have never been 
seriously considered in the UK since 1965.  Partly for the reason that BWRs tend to 
produce higher operator doses than other reactor types, it seems improbable that 
ABWRs would compete in the UK. 
§ AECL of Canada has developed variants of a pressurised heavy water reactor (Candu) 
for many years and has publicly expressed their desire to compete in the UK market.  
CANDU designs of close-to-current-vintage have been built in Korea and it is 
conceivable that CANDU designs could be licensed in the UK.  However it seems 
unlikely that CANDU designs would seriously compete in the UK market, especially as 
the technology licensing process would take substantially longer than for the PWR 
designs mentioned below. 
§ The Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR), under development in South Africa and with 
BNFL as a minority partner has been much publicised as a more radical alternative.  The 
PBMR is a development of an earlier German high temperature reactor design and has 
several novel design features, including helium coolant directly driving a gas turbine, and 
small spherical fuel elements.  It was originally hoped to complete a demonstration plant 
by 2003, allowing commercial ordering soon after.  However there have been delays to 
this timetable, most recently the legal revocation of an earlier environmental approval to 
construct the demonstration plant.  Such a plant is now unlikely to be complete before 
2010 at the earliest.  Given a need both to accumulate operating experience on this plant 
and to gain safety regulatory approval in the UK, PBMR technology is unlikely to be 
available in the UK until close to 2020.   Costs are necessarily uncertain, but the 
expected cost of the demonstration plant has itself escalated by a factor of around seven 
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since 199910.  In these circumstances it is impossible to know what the costs would be 
for a commercially available, fully licensed, PBMR. 
This leaves the two obvious front-runners for future reactor types in the UK, the AP1000 
pressurised water reactor (AP1000) developed by Westinghouse/BNFL and the European 
Pressurised Water Reactor (EPR), developed by Framatome/Siemens (now offered by 
Areva, Framatome’s parent).  Both are developments (often called ‘evolutionary’) from 
Westinghouse PWR technology: in the case of the AP1000, around 1100MW, the changes 
involve more passive safety systems and simplified design; and in the case of the EPR, the 
changes mostly involve scaling up to 1600-1750MW unit size to gain economies of scale.  
Neither of these reactors has yet been built anywhere in the world, though the first EPR 
started construction in Finland in late summer 2005 and France will probably start a second 
unit at home in 2006.  Both technologies have established regulatory clearance in important 
markets: the AP1000 in the USA, and EPR in Finland and France.   
The important conclusion from the above discussion is that the two leading competitors for 
UK construction have not yet been built anywhere in the world, so that experience from 
current orders and recent completions overseas are of little relevance to the UK.      
4.2. Data sources 
The first and most important point about data sources on the costs of new construction is 
that there are very few that relate directly to the UK.  In practice only three studies aim to 
provide data directly relevant to the UK and these are the DTI’s views (2005)11, the 2004 
Royal Academy of Engineering report and the 2005 Oxera study.12  The PIU study of 200213 
also provided some data on nuclear costs without being able to disclose confidential details 
from the nuclear industry of expected capital costs.  The PIU figures have been superseded 
by more recent developments.  The New Economics Foundation also provide views on 
future nuclear costs in the UK14 but these are not based on any recent data and are 
inferential in nature.  The first three studies are therefore the only sources of cost data that 
currently and directly apply to UK conditions.   
The touchstone of data quality (and possible bias) is the material that each report provides 
on nuclear capital costs.  The DTI capital cost figures are reported to derive from ‘industry 
sources and modelling work’.  The origin of the Oxera figures is not made clear, but may well, 
by arithmetic interpolation, be based on the DTI figures.  The RAE sources are ambiguous: 
the main report suggests that its data are directly derived from the MIT study into US nuclear 
economics,15 while a complementary presentation on the study by RAE’s contractors (PB 
Power) suggests that the capital costs are based on reported Finnish EPR costs.  Whichever 
the basic source may be, each derives from an uncritical translation of overseas capital cost 
                                               
10  S. Thomas The economic impact of the proposed demonstration plant for the Pebble Bed Modular reactor design, 
PSIRU, University of Greenwich August 2005, pp. 20-22.   
11  Department of Trade and Industry, 2005 
12  Oxford Economic Research Associates, Financing the nuclear option: modelling the cost of new build, Oxera, June 
2005 
13  Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU) The Energy Review, Cabinet Office 2002; Working Paper on the Economics of 
Nuclear Power. 
14  New Economics Foundation, Mirage and oasis: Energy choices in an age of global warming, NEF, June 2005 
15  Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The Future of Nuclear Power: an interdisciplinary MIT study,  MIT, 2002, esp. 
Chapter 5 
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expectations to UK conditions.  The DTI sources leave no clear audit trail, but while 
‘modelling’ cannot independently generate capital cost figures, it seems reasonable to infer 
that the DTI figures used are based on ‘industry sources’.  Such sources are presumably 
from the nuclear industry and given that Westinghouse is currently owned by BNFL (a UK 
state-owned company) it seems likely that the source of the data is Westinghouse.  Whether 
or not this is the case ‘industry sources’ have incentives - especially in a pre-contractual 
situation - to offer a view of nuclear costs that will be optimistic. It is not clear whether DTI 
have amended the industry figures to correct for any perceived bias or optimism.   
There are many more sources of economic data from overseas sources.  There are obvious 
difficulties in transposing these to UK circumstances.  The reasons for this are several: 
§ Where different reactor technologies from those likely to be used in the UK are being 
costed, there will be no direct application to the UK. 
§ It is not usually helpful to translate costs denominated in other currencies directly into 
sterling costs, because the industrial structures, labour conditions and regulatory 
regimes vary widely between countries.  More generally the prices of non-tradable inputs 
(especially labour) are highly variable.  Attempts have been made in some studies to 
correct for some of these problems by using purchasing power parity exchange rates 
rather than current or official exchange rates but these can only be partially successful – 
if only because of the differences in regulatory regime, which in turn influences design 
details.  
There are three other problems in data comparisons, not applying only to overseas 
estimates: 
§ The scope of cost estimates, especially for capital costs, may vary widely and cannot 
always be discerned.  Some estimates include financing costs16, owner’s costs, first-of-a-
kind costs, and others may exclude some or all of these, rendering comparisons 
inaccurate.  Allowances for contingencies are variable and are not always explicit. 
§ The price basis for some estimates is not always clear – different estimates may be 
denominated in prices of different years and the price base is not clear in all studies. 
§ Some studies quote figures for the first reactor of a particular technology while others 
quote only ‘nth’ of a kind.  Given that the nuclear industry universally expects costs of 
later units to fall substantially with experience of building identical units, this can make a 
substantial difference to estimates. 
With these caveats in mind, some international sources can be reviewed.  The NEA and IEA 
provided data in 200517 for notional future nuclear plants in 11 countries (not including the 
UK – data from the UK, with costs quoted in Sterling, comes from the Department of Trade 
and Industry but is not incorporated into the main body of the report), while easily the most 
thorough and comprehensive studies come from the USA.  Three studies are especially 
noteworthy: 
                                               
16  For a publicly financed project, financing costs are generally irrelevant to investment appraisal, as they are subsumed in 
a (higher) discount rate derived on other criteria.  However, with private financing, financing costs are a social cost to 
be included, no less that the cost of materials.  In practice this is normally done by including, in the costs to be 
recovered from sales, capital charges that would give a rate of return equal to the weighted average cost of capital.  
17  Nuclear Energy Agency / International Energy Agency, Projected Costs of Generating Electricity, OECD, 2005, esp. 
p149-152 
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§ Scully Capital (2002) provided for the USDoE a ‘business case’ for new nuclear build in 
the USA18, with cost data plus much detail on possible financing schemes and 
Government assistance. 
§ MIT conducted a major and much-publicised study in 2003 on nuclear power in general, 
including economics. 
§ The University of Chicago conducted another study for the US DoE in 200419, on the 
overall economics of possible new nuclear power plant in the USA, with significant detail 
on the applicable cost of capital. 
The most interesting question then becomes the source of these reports’ capital cost data.  
In the case of Scully, the main source appears to be Westinghouse: Scully consulted mostly 
industry sources and quotes figures based on the AP1000.  MIT sources for capital costs are 
‘consistent’ with earlier figures from the USDoE EIA (themselves derived mainly from 
industry sources) and from the OECD.  MIT however correct for some possible appraisal 
optimism by adding a 10% contingency and a further 10% allowance for ‘optimism’ to their 
source figures. The University of Chicago study uses figures for capital costs for ABWRs, 
Candus, AP1000 and a Framatome BWR design. The sources for these data appear to be 
the USDoE, AECL, Westinghouse and, possibly, Framatome.  It seems unlikely that Chicago 
significantly amended these data before using them in its analysis.   
An Areva (France) study on the costs of the EPR20 gives some relevant data on the 
assumption of a 10-reactor programme.  Given that Areva is a vendor with interests in selling 
into the UK market its cost estimates need to be treated with some caution as the vendors’ 
commercial incentive is clearly to estimate optimistically.   
The most interesting overseas cost case is that of Finland, the only OECD Europe country to 
have a live order.  This leads to the possibility that capital cost data, while still a forecast, 
might be more commercially based than relying on than paper studies, mostly from vendors.  
However the Finnish study pre-dates the recent order and deals in a smaller reactor size.  
There is also a single piece of data giving a single and rough capital cost figure, based on 
the turnkey (fixed price) contract and for the recent Finnish order, but its scope is not clear 
(see section 6.3 below).  There are other sources which quote some cost figures for 
countries such as China, Japan and Korea but their value for the UK is dubious.  All are 
using technologies unlikely to be offered in the UK and all have cost and industrial structures 
so different from those of the UK that translation of their data into UK terms is of very limited 
obvious value.   
 
                                               
18  Scully Capital, Business Case for Early Orders of New Nuclear Reactors, 2004, esp. p5-5 
19  The University of Chicago, The Economic Future of Nuclear Power, August 2004 
20  EPR Background and its Role in Continental Europe, AREVA Corporate Strategy Department, Didier Beutier, 
Westminster Energy Forum Thursday 23rd June 2005. 
Economics of Nuclear Power Analytical Comparisons of Cost Data
 
 
NERA Economic Consulting 
Science & Technology Policy Research, University of Sussex  
 
 
14
5. Analytical Comparisons of Cost Data 
The main sources that are compared here are those of the DTI, RAE, Oxera and a limited 
number of international studies: the NEA/IEA report, a Finnish report21, an Areva study and 
three studies from the US.  Numbers are reported in original currencies as well as sterling 
because of the problems of uncritically using exchange rates for this purpose.  
The main focus here is on capital costs for reasons already well-rehearsed.  However the 
other components of cost are dealt with first, leaving the most critical cost component for 
more detailed analysis.   
5.1. Fuel, O&M and back-end costs  
As argued earlier, these costs are relatively unimportant in determining the status of nuclear 
power economics.  In addition there are wide-ranging, fairly reliable data on these costs from 
operating reactors, and there seems no reason why – despite the relative novelty of potential 
new UK reactors – such performance should not broadly indicate future performance.  Back 
end costs are more complex and final costs, especially for wastes, are highly uncertain. But 
because these costs are postponed well into the future, even low discount rates mean that 
even quite large variations on decommissioning and waste costs will have little impact on 
overall generating costs.   
Table 5.1 compares quoted costs for fuel and O&M and treatment of back end costs across 
the various studies.  
                                               
21  Tarjanne and Rissanen, Nuclear Power: Least-Cost Option for Baseload Electricity in Finland, The Uranium Institute 
25th Annual Symposium, 30 August – 1 September 
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Table 5.1 
Different Cost Estimates:  Fuel, O&M, and Back-end 
 Fuel cost O&M Cost Back-end 
DTI Na Na Na 
RAE 0.4p/kWh 0.45p/kWh Decommissioning 
costs within 
capital cost 
OXERA 0.3p/kWh 035p/kWh £500m fund at 40 
years 
NEA / IEA 0.28-
1.18USc/kWh      
46-108USD/kW    Decommissioning 
included in 
construction cost 
Areva 0.44ec/kWh €51/kW Decommissioning 
€6.5/kW 
Tarjanne and 
Rissanen 
0.1ec/kWh 0.34ec/kWh Na 
Scully 0.5USc/kWh 0.5USc/kWh $400m fund at 40 
years 
MIT 0.15USc/kWh 
(fuel plus O&M) 
 Na 
Chicago 0.3USc/kWh 0.56USc/kWh $300m fund  
Source; DTI (2003) , Royal Academy of Engineering (2004) p42, Oxera (2005) p3, NEA (2005) p44, Areva (2005) p16, Tarjanne and 
Rissanen (2000) p8, Scully Capital (2004) p5-5, MIT (2002) p43 and The University of Chicago (2004) p. 
For most studies it is not possible to tell which year’s prices are used in setting out cost numbers.  Oxera is one exception, quoting a 2005 
price base.  For the other studies a reasonable guess is that they may be using the prices of the year of publication. 
The UK aggregate figures for fuel and O&M are 0.85p/kWh from RAE and 0.65p/kWH from 
Oxera.  The French and Finnish figures are broadly at the low end of this range.  The US 
fuel costs are broadly comparable to the UK figures, while the O&M costs tend to be higher 
for specifically US regulatory reasons.  Fuel costs have been broadly stable or falling for 
some years.  The bulk of fuel costs are for uranium conversion and enrichment and fuel 
fabrication and these are stable and mature industries.  Uranium itself accounts for only 
some 10% of the cost of nuclear fuel.    
O&M costs vary by country but tend to be low where operating performance is good (high 
availability means few breakdowns and repairs) and have tended to fall as the periods 
between reactor servicing have lengthened and outage periods reduced.  In UK conditions, 
the 0.65p/kWh to 0.85p/kWh range from RAE and Oxera will probably span the range of 
probable future costs in these areas: the chances of significantly exceeding 0.85p/kWh seem 
small.   
5.2. Capital costs, construction time and operating performance  
While capital costs are the headline issue here, both operating performance and 
construction time are also potentially important.  Short construction times tend to be 
associated with low costs, but even where there is limited correlation between time and cost, 
extended construction times raise total capital costs by significantly increasing financing 
costs – interest during construction on funds tied up increases directly with project length.  
Construction times in the studies examined here (when specified) are generally in a narrow 
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range: RAE 5 years;22 NEA/IEA 5-10 years;23 Areva 5.5 years;24 Scully 5 years;25 MIT 5 
years;26 Chicago 5.3 – 9.3 years.27   The definition of construction time is not always clear. 
Ideally it should be from start on site to commissioning, with substantial pre-construction 
periods applying in all cases.  
Five years is the minimum construction time assumed in the studies examined, while both 
NEA/IEA and Chicago (reporting in both cases across much international experience) 
contemplate significantly longer periods.  Construction times of five years and less have 
been achieved in East Asia in recent years (Japan and Korea) on different designs.  While 5 
years may be optimistic, six years is probably a reasonable expectation for the UK.  The 
impact on overall generating cost of a year’s difference compared to six years, in either 
direction, would be small – although if delays are correlated with capital cost overruns, the 
impact via capital costs could be substantial.     
Operating performance – measured as load factor or proportion of the year that a plant 
produces rated output – is important because higher output stretches a given capital cost 
over more units and thus reduces capital cost per kilowatt hour.  Operating performance of 
UK gas-cooled reactors, especially the newer designs of AGR, has been poor by 
international standards.  Performance has however substantially improved in recent years 
and because poor earlier performance was largely technology-specific. It is in any case a 
largely irrelevant guide to future performance in PWR-related technologies.  The one UK 
PWR at Sizewell B has had good operating performance since commissioning in 1994 
(averaging around 84%). Worldwide, operating performance has also been higher and more 
consistent since the early 1990s.  In the range of operating performance levels now 
commonly seen worldwide (rarely below 80% and sometimes exceeding 90%) the impact of 
variation on overall nuclear economics is quite limited. 
In the studies examined here assumptions about load factors (where specified) are as 
follows: DTI 85%28; RAE 85%29; Oxera 95%30; NEA/IEA 85%31; Areva 90.3%32; Finland 
91%33; Scully 90%34; MIT 75%-85%35; Chicago 85%36.  The Oxera figure is probably 
                                               
22  Royal Academy of Engineering, The Cost of Generating Electricity, RAE, June 2004, p41 
23  Nuclear Energy Agency / International Energy Agency, Projected Costs of Generating Electricity, OECD, 2005, p43 
24  EPR Background and its Role in Continental Europe, AREVA Corporate Strategy Department, Didier Beutier, 
Westminster Energy Forum Thursday 23rd June 2005 p16 
25  Scully Capital, Business Case for Early Orders of New Nuclear Reactors, 2004, p5-5 
26  Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The Future of Nuclear Power: an interdisciplinary MIT study, , MIT, 2002, p43 
27  The University of Chicago, The Economic Future of Nuclear Power, August 2004, p2-13 
28  Department of Trade and Industry,  
29  Royal Academy of Engineering, The Cost of Generating Electricity, RAE, June 2004, p42 and calculated utilising DCF 
analysis 
30  Oxford Economic Research Associates, Financing the nuclear option: modelling the cost of new build, Oxera, June 
2005, p3  
31  Nuclear Energy Agency / International Energy Agency, Projected Costs of Generating Electricity, OECD, 2005, p152 
32  EPR Background and its Role in Continental Europe, AREVA Corporate Strategy Department, Didier Beutier, 
Westminster Energy Forum Thursday 23rd June 2005 p16 
33  Tarjanne and Rissanen, Nuclear Power: Least-Cost Option for Baseload Electricity in Finland, The Uranium Institute 
25th Annual Symposium, 30 August – 1 September p2 
34  Scully Capital, Business Case for Early Orders of New Nuclear Reactors, 2004, p5-5 
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optimistic as it exceeds any consistent historic world performance.  Owners of new plant will 
generally aim for around 90% but this would be an optimistic number in appraising an 
investment in a technology not yet built anywhere in the world, and bearing in mind that 
operating performance may take a few years to ‘settle down’.  A figure of 85% would seem a 
fair expectation of a future UK reactor.     
5.2.1. Capital costs   
As argued earlier the economic status of nuclear power turns largely on capital cost.  The 
history of cost control in the UK has been poor.  All first generation AGRS over-ran 
significantly, and the Sizewell B PWR over-ran by at least 35% in real terms, ending up (in 
today’s money) at little short of £3bn. for a 1175 MW reactor (well over £2000/kW).  But this 
history is probably a poor guide to prospective future performance for reasons outlined in 
Section 1.   
On the other hand, as section 4 makes clear above, the data available on this most critical 
cost component is very thin.  It suffers in the following ways: 
§ None of the UK-related capital cost data appears to have been calculated for UK 
conditions: it appears, sometimes quite explicitly, to be a direct translation from overseas 
data, all for reactors not yet built and therefore paper-based.  
§ A significant part of the explanation for the differences in capital cost between different 
studies, and in some cases the differences in quoted costs within the same study, is 
variation in assumptions about the number of reactors built.  A programme of essentially 
identical reactors, usually a minimum of 8 or 10, is expected to lead to significant 
reductions in average capital cost per kW as a result of learning plus batch production 
rather than one-off component ordering.  For instance recent Korean data suggests that 
the seventh and eight units in a series may have capital costs per kW as much as 28% 
below the costs of units 1 and 2 in the series.37 Much confusion results from the fact that 
not all studies make clear whether or not a single reactor or a programme is being 
assumed.  To reap the full benefits of learning requires a commitment to a scheduled 
programme of identical reactors at the first decision point.  This largely explains the 
argument made by the UK nuclear industry in 2001 that commitment to a programme of 
10GW of reactors would be necessary.38 It also, when combined with the large unit size 
of potential new reactors is a source of inflexibility: low cost can only be achieved if very 
large commitments are made. 
§ All of the data is traced back to industry sources, usually reactor vendors, and the 
number of these sources is very few.  This is probably inevitable when discussing not-
yet-built reactors, but it does little for confidence in the balanced nature of the numbers.  
Reactor vendors inevitably and legitimately have an interest in presenting costs in a way 
that maximises their chances of commercial success: their incentive structure inevitably 
leads them towards relatively optimistic estimates, especially in advance of contractual 
commitments.  Some of the original costs quoted by vendors have been augmented by 
                                                                                                                                                  
35  Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The Future of Nuclear Power: an interdisciplinary MIT study, MIT, 2002, p43 
36  The University of Chicago, The Economic Future of Nuclear Power, August 2004 
37  R. A. Matzie, Building New Nuclear Plants to Cost and Schedule – an International Perspective, presentation to RAE 
seminar, September 29 2005, p. 5 
38  British Energy, Replace nuclear with nuclear: Submission to the Government’s Review of Energy Policy, British 
Energy, 2002, p16-23 
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to allow for optimism (explicitly in the MIT study, and probably in the case of the higher 
DTI figure) but the allowances for optimism appear to be relatively limited compared to 
the possible scale of cost overruns on large and substantially novel projects.  In some 
cases, no such adjustments have been made (e.g. Scully). Appraisal optimism’ is 
widespread across large infrastructure projects and many countries.  For example the 
World Bank studied capital cost results compared to forecasts across a wide range of its 
own energy projects.  It concluded that the error in original estimates was in well over 
90% of cases studies in the direction of initial optimism and that more complex projects 
(mainly hydro electricity) tended to be more optimistic than simpler and less expensive 
projects.39 More recently and more widely Flyvbjerg et al (2003)40 has offered wide-
ranging analysis of the pervasiveness of appraisal optimism across many large and 
complex projects.  The basic argument that project promoters, especially when they will 
not suffer the full consequences of optimism, will gain advantage from a tendency to 
under-estimate costs and risks, is straightforward.   
§ Where vendors enter into contracts for reactor sales, data may well become more 
realistic because vendors may well suffer losses if they contract at too low a price.  
However there are important qualifications here:  only one such contract exists, for 
Finland, and the data released is aggregative and rounded; vendors may well pursue 
‘loss-leaders’ on early contracts in the expectation of later, more profitable contracts as 
learning takes place; and the likelihood of various kinds of Government assistance, (e.g. 
including guarantees of the kind now being offered in the USA) needed to stimulate 
private nuclear investment may well loosen the link between cost over-runs and vendor 
losses. Finally ‘turnkey’ contracts’ are unlikely to indemnify clients against all risks, and in 
the case of the Finnish contract there is no public information, for example, on the 
existence and scope of any ‘force majeure’ clauses. 
§ While all the studies quoted include financing costs in their overall calculation of 
generating cost, it is not always clear whether or not the costs in Table 5.3 are ‘overnight’ 
costs41 (excluding financing) or are total costs (including financing, which involves 
assumptions about construction time, debt/equity structure and cost of capital).    
This means that while the capital cost figures quoted in Table 5.2 below may well represent 
a range of achievable costs if all goes well, they do not capture the real uncertainties that 
exist in current UK circumstances.  The RAE approach of suggesting a plus or minus 25% 
range for capital costs seems misguided. In current circumstances risks are not equally 
distributed about the average: the distribution is heavily skewed to a higher probability of 
overrun than cost savings.  There really is no way of knowing a realistic capital cost of a new 
UK reactor and the uncertainty range is very pronounced  
                                               
39  R. Bacon et al.  Estimating Construction costs and Schedules,  World Bank technical Paper no. 325, Washington DC 
1996, esp. pages 1 and 28   
40  Flyvbjerg et al, Megaprojects and Risk, Cambridge University Press, 2005 
41  Overnight costs are the sum of all costs without considering time. They are expressed as if all incurred instantly, or 
‘overnight’. ‘Total’ costs in this context is the sum of all expenditures incurred in a real project, including the interest 
costs incurred on capital tied up during construction. 
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Table 5.2 
Different Cost Estimates:  Capital Costs 
 Capital 
costs/kW 
First/nth unit Included/ Excluded 
DTI £1,070-1,400 Not known Not known 
RAE £1,150 Probably nth Not clear 
OXERA £1,150-£1,625 £1,625 first 
 £1,150 nth 
Includes 30% contingency 
for first reactor, licensing, 
public enquiry, start-up 
costs 
NEA / IEA $1100-2500 Probably variable Overnight costs only 
Areva €1,252 Nth Includes start-up costs 
Tarjanne and 
Rissanen’ 
€2160 First Not known 
Scully $1,000-1,600 $1,600 first/ 
$1,000 nth 
Appears to exclude 
owner’s cost/contingency.  
No financing included 
MIT $2,000 Not specified Includes adjustments of 
10% for contingency plus 
10% for optimism 
Chicago $1080-1980 Variable according 
to estimate  
Excludes financing costs. 
Owner’s costs included, 
plus first of a kind 
engineering costs for 
higher estimates 
Source; DTI (2003), Royal Academy of Engineering (2004) p41, Oxera (2005) p3, NEA (2005) p151, Areva (2005) p15, Tarjanne and 
Rissanen (2000) p8, Scully Capital (2004) p5-5, MIT (2002) p43 and The University of Chicago (2004) p1-8. 
Note:  For most studies it is not possible to tell which year’s prices are used in setting out cost numbers.  Oxera is one exception, quoting a 
2005 price base.  For the other studies a reasonable guess is that they may be using the prices of the year of publication. 
Many of the studies quoted above provide estimates of the overall generating cost of 
electricity using their own input assumptions.  Other studies provide an estimate of the 
generating cost in terms of cost/kWh and in such cases comparisons can be made with the 
costs of other technologies.  Some studies, however, provide an estimate of the internal rate 
of return at an expected sales price.  This is then compared to the expected cost of capital in 
order to judge the viability of the investment.  This can be useful in terms of judging project 
profitability and commercial feasibility, but it does not help if one objective is to compare 
nuclear generating costs to the expected generating costs of other technologies.    
Because published studies do not show the precise method by which different input costs 
are translated into generating costs, and because the assumptions made will vary and be of 
differing methodological quality, it is not possible in this report to evaluate whether or not the 
overall calculations are robust, and this in turn means that comparisons between the overall 
results of different studies are also problematic.   
However it may be useful to present these overall results from the various studies to show 
the variability of results.  There are several causes of variations which, in the absence of 
access to individual study modelling procedures, cannot be precisely attributed.  Obvious 
causes of variations are, as would be expected from earlier analysis, differences in the 
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assumptions about capital costs, and whether the first, average, or ‘nth’ unit is being 
considered.  In addition, significant differences will undoubtedly be due to differences in 
assumptions about discount rates and/or the cost of capital (including different specific 
financing assumptions).  Of the six sets of results presented below from the studies 
examined, three use a traditional ‘levelised’ form of calculation. This provides an annualised 
cost per kilowatt hour and uses a standard discount rate or cost of capital.  It is the method 
often used by monopoly utilities facing a relatively stable future economic environment.  The 
other three studies make explicit assumptions about financing (e.g. debt/equity ratios, 
expected return on each) and these, depending on the accuracy of the financing 
assumptions, are more applicable methodologically to private sector decision-making.   
The results from the six studies are shown in tabular form below.  It is clear that even within 
a single jurisdiction (the USA) there remain wide divergences between cost expectations, 
determined significantly by methods of generating cost calculation as well as differences in 
basic input assumptions such as capital costs.  
Table 5.3 
Overall Cost Estimates from Six Studies 
Study Method Assumption 
about no. of 
units built 
Central Results Sensitivity/ 
Range 
MIT Levelised No clear, poss. 
1st 
6.7 USc/kWh 4.9c-7.9c 
RAE Levelised Not clear 2.26p/kWh 2.44p 
NEA/IEA Levelised Not clear 3 USc-
5USc/kWh 
 
Chicago Levelised 1st unit 6.2 USc/kWh 5.2c-7.1c 
Scully Levelised 1st unit 3.8-4.2 USc/k 
Wh 
3.4c-3.7c 
Oxera Levelised 1st unit Produces 
internal rate of 
return of 8%-
11% (nominal, 
while market 
may need 14%-
16%). 
10.6%-13.6% 
(8th unit) 
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6. International Case Studies 
In this section we set out the information available on international nuclear power projects 
under construction or planned and available cost forecasts for each country.  While the 
objective is to give an overview of potential comparator projects for the UK, the relevance of 
different countries’ experience is clearly very different.  Data on the more potentially relevant 
costs have already been included in Sections 4 and 5 above.  Here we set out international 
experience in more detail. In two cases (Finland and China) we provide more detailed 
information on projected plant costs and financing mechanisms.    
6.1. Making International Comparisons 
In comparing international examples we must be aware of the differences in plant 
performance between countries.  One obvious difference is the use of different types of 
technology and size of reactor.  Table 6.2 includes information on both of these variables for 
each plant planned and under construction.   
However, even where different countries construct plants using the same technology and a 
similar unit size the performance of the reactor may differ.  Table 6.1 shows three indicators 
of performance for eight countries currently constructing plants, plus the UK and France.  
The energy availability factor indicates the ratio of energy produced by the unit relative to the 
maximum amount of energy the unit could produce.  The unit capability factor reflects 
effectiveness of plant programs and practices in maximising available electrical generation, 
and provides an overall indication of how well plants are operated and maintained.  Where, 
as in the case of India, energy availability falls well below unit capability, this may be due to 
transmission system problems, in other words an inability to transmit available power from 
the power station to customers.  Finally, the unplanned capability loss factor reflects the 
effectiveness of plant programs and practices in maintaining systems available for safe 
electrical generation. 
Table 6.1  
Comparison of UK and Countries with Reactors under Construction 
Country
2004 Energy Availability Factor 
(%)
2004 Unit Capability Factor 
(%)
2004 Unplanned Capability Loss 
Factor (%)
UNITED KINGDOM 74.2 74.6 9.4
FINLAND 93.3 93.4 1.2
France 81.4 83 5.3
ROMANIA 89.1 89.4 2.9
ARGENTINA 89.2 89.2 3.5
CHINA 84.3 84.5 3.8
UKRAINE 81 85.1 1
INDIA 70.8 83.4 1.4
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 72.4 75.4 3.1
JAPAN 67.7 67.8 13.3  
Source: IAEA, Power Reactor Information System, 2004.  Note:  Figures are cumulative factors from 2002-2004 where 
applicable. 
The indicators represent the performance of each country’s existing reactors between 2002 
and 2004.  As is evident from the table, there is strong variation in every indicator between 
countries.  This reflects variations in technology and performance.  For example, existing 
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reactors in the UK are based on AGR and Magnox technology whilst most other European 
reactors are variants of water reactors.    
Although these indicators do not necessarily reflect accurately differences in performance of 
future reactors, they do illustrate the difficulties in drawing conclusions using international 
comparisons based on existing plants with varying technologies. 
6.2. Plants under Construction and Planned 
Table 6.2 shows plants under construction globally as at September 2005, and Table 6.3 
shows possible nuclear plants order in the next 2-3 years. 
Table 6.2 
Nuclear Plants under Construction, 2005 
Country Plant Name Type of Reactor Vendor Net Capacity Construction Started
Estimated Commercial 
Operation
India KAIGA Candu India 202 MWe 30/03/2002 31/03/2007
India KAIGA Candu India 202 MWe 10/05/2002 30/09/2007
India KUDANKULAM WWER Russia 917 MWe 31/03/2002 31/12/2007
India KUDANKULAM WWER Russia 917 MWe 04/07/2002 31/12/2008
India MADRAS FBR India 470 MWe 23/10/2004 N/A
India RAJASTHAN Candu India 202 MWe 18/09/2002 31/08/2007
India RAJASTHAN Candu India 202 MWe 20/01/2003 28/02/2008
India TARAPUR Candu India 490 MWe 12/05/2000 31/01/2007
Russia BALAKOVO WWER Russia 950 MWe 01/04/1987 N/A
Russia KALININ WWER Russia 950 MWe 01/08/1986 N/A
Russia KURSK RBMK Russia 925 MWe 01/12/1985 N/A
Russia VOLGODONSK WWER Russia 950 MWe 01/05/1983 N/A
Taiwan Lungmen 1 ABWR GE 1300 Mwe 1999 2009
Taiwan Lungmen 2 ABWR GE 1300 Mwe 1999 2010
China TIANWAN WWER Russia 1000 MWe 20/10/1999 N/A
China TIANWAN WWER Russia 1000 MWe 20/10/2000 N/A
Japan HIGASHI DORI BWR Toshiba 1067 MWe 07/11/2000 01/10/2005
Japan TOMARI PWR Mitsubishi 866 MWe 18/11/2004 01/12/2009
Ukraine KHMELNITSKI WWER Net Capacity 950 MWe 01/03/1986 N/A
Ukraine KHMELNITSKI WWER Net Capacity 950 MWe 01/02/1987 N/A
Finland OLKILUOTO PWR Framatome 1600 MWe 12/08/2005 2009
Iran BUSHEHR WWER Russia 915 MWe 01/05/1975 01/12/2006
Romania CERNAVODA Candu AECL 655 MWe 01/07/1983 01/03/2007
Argentina ATUCHA PHWR Net Capacity 692 MWe 14/07/1981 N/A  
Source: IAEA, Power Reactor Information System, Last updated on 2005/09/1 and Steve Thomas, The economics of nuclear 
power: analysis of recent studies, July 2005, PSIRU, Page 6. 
Table 6.3 
Possible Nuclear Plants orders in the next 2-3 years 
 
Country Site Bidders Need Possible order date Forecast completion
China Sanmen 
Areva (EPR), BNFL/Westinghouse 
(AP1000), Russia (WWER-1000) 2x1000MW 2005/06 N/A
China Yangjiang 
Areva (EPR), BNFL/Westinghouse 
(AP1000), Russia (WWER-1000) 2x1000MW 2005/06 N/A
France Flamanville 3 Areva (EPR) 1x1600MW 2006 2012
Korea Shin-Kori 1&2 Korea (KSNP) 2x1000MW 2005 2010, 2012
Korea Shin-Kori 3&4 Korea (APR-1400) 2x1400MW 2006 2012, 2013
Japan  Tsuruga 3&4 Mitsubishi (APWR) 2x1500MW 2006 2014  
Source: Steve Thomas, The economics of nuclear power: analysis of recent studies, July 2005, PSIRU, Page 6. 
The following sections present published estimates of the costs of nuclear power plants in 
each of the countries which are currently constructing new plants.  The costs presented 
include constructions costs, operation and maintenance costs and fuel costs.  Other costs 
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such as licensing costs and back end costs are not always included.  However, they may be 
very large. 
Where possible we report the discount rate used to calculate costs estimates and in a 
number of cases we show the impact of variation of the discount rate on estimates.  Overall, 
the impact of the discount rate is important.  For example, doubling the discount rate (from 5-
10%) on an estimate of French construction costs has the effect of increasing construction 
costs from $13.91/MWh to $27.50MWh see Table 6.5.  Chapter 7 and Appendix A discuss 
further discounting and the cost of capital. 
6.2.1. India 
India has the largest number of plants under construction by a long way.  However, Indian 
plants are predominantly built according to a 1960s Canadian design, as India’s nuclear 
bomb testing in the 1970’s resulted in a severing of communication with all western 
suppliers.42  For example the PHWR unit under construction at Tarapur was developed 
indigenously from the 220 MW (gross) model PHWR, ten of which have been operating for 
up to 21 years.43 
The exception is the two largest construction projects underway in India at Kudankulam.  
The two VVER-1000 (V-392) reactors are being supplied by Russia, under a Russian-
financed US$3 billion contract. The units are being built by NPCIL and will be commissioned 
and operated by it under safeguards.44 
The age and type of reactor design makes Indian plants generally a poor comparator for new 
plants being built in the UK.  
Forecast Costs 
Table 6.4 illustrates the forecast generation costs of two 500MW PHWR reactors which were 
planned in 1996.  The costs are of the same order of magnitude as forecasts for projects in 
France during the same period and marginally more than those in Finland.45  However, more 
up to date forecasts for Indian nuclear generation costs are not available. 
Table 6.4 
Projected Indian Generation Costs under Varying Discount Rates 
Investment O&M Fuel Total
$/MWh $/MWh $/MWh $/MWh
1996 estimate (5%) 19.16 6.07 7.59 32.82
1996 estimate (10%) 37.30 6.15 7.59 51.04  
Source: Projected Costs of Generating Electricity, OECD 1998 p51-52 
Note: Capital costs include interest during construction, licensing and decommissioning.  The figures are in 1996 US$’s. 
                                               
42  Steve Thomas, The economics of nuclear power: analysis of recent studies, July 2005, PSIRU, Page 4. 
43  World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power in India, March 2005 (http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf53.htm). 
44  World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power in India, March 2005 (http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf53.htm). 
45  In France a 1450 MW PWR reactor was estimated to cost 2% and 4% more than the Indian forecast (under a discount 
rate of 5% and 10% respectively).  In Finland a 1000MW BWR reactor was estimated to cost 12% and 9% less than the 
Indian forecast (under a discount rate of 5% and 10% respectively). 
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6.2.2. France 
The most recent nuclear plant constructed in France was a PWR reactor (Civaux 2) which 
started construction in 1991, came on line in 1999, and began commercial operation in 2002.  
EdF are now reported to be planning to build the first demonstration unit of an expected 
series of 1600 MW Framatome ANP EPRs.  Construction of France's first unit is expected to 
start in 2007 at Flamanville on the Normandy coast, following public consultation and 
licensing. Construction is then expected to take 57 months to start up in 2012. EdF is aiming 
to firm up an industrial partnership with other European utilities or power users for its 
construction. 
Forecast Costs 
The French General Directorate for Energy and Raw Materials (previously the Directorate of 
Gas Electricity and Coal (DIGEC)) assessed the forecast costs of nuclear power in two 
studies published by the IEA in 1998 and 2005. These forecasts are set out in Table 6.5 
below. 
Table  6.5  
Projected French Generation Costs under Varying Discount Rates 
Investment O&M Fuel Total
$/MWh $/MWh $/MWh $/MWh
2003 estimate (5%) 13.91 6.45 5.00 25.36
2003 estimate (10%) 27.50 6.40 5.30 39.30
1996 estimate (5%) 17.39 6.77 8.07 32.24
1996 estimate (10%) 34.61 6.86 7.69 49.15  
Source: Projected Costs of Generating Electricity, OECD 2005 p51-52 and Projected Costs of Generating Electricity, 
OECD 1998 p67-69.   
Note; Capital costs include interest during construction, licensing and decommissioning.  The figures are in 1996 and 2003 
US$’s. 
The 1998 study conducted by the Directorate of Gas Electricity and Coal (DIGEC) shows the 
costs of a PWR 1450MW second sub series, similar to existing plants at Civaux (1) and 
Chooz (B).  The costs are those assumed for a plant located at an average site with four 
reactors but with a programme of ten reactors.  The load factor assumed is 84% and the 
lifetime is 30 years. 
The 2005 study estimates the costs of an EPR reactor of the same type under construction 
in Finland (see section 6.3).  Table 6.6 sets out in more detail the forecast costs of an EPR 
reactor based on the 8% discount rate assumed by DGEMP in their study. 
Whether or how these French forecast data relate to actual experience of nuclear 
construction in France is not clear.  It does not seem possible to obtain data on the station 
by station cost history of France’s large and comparatively recent nuclear construction 
programme. 
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Table 6.6  
Breakdown of the investment costs in France for a series of  
EPR (10 units); 2003 estimate 
Estimated Costs EPR
Capital Cost €/kW 1283
Interest during 
Construction
€/kW 380
Construction Lead Time years 5
O & M Cost €/kW 51
O & M Cost (variable) €/MWh 0.61
Fuel Cost €/MWh 4.4
R&D Cost €/MWh 0.6
Load Factor / Availability % 90.30
Technology Lifetime years 60
Discount Rate % 8  
Source; EPR Background and its Role in Continental Europe, AREVA Corporate Strategy Department, Didier Beutier, 
Westminster Energy Forum Thursday 23rd June 2005, p16.   
Note: Investment cost is the mean for ten units.  The currency basis is not reported. 
6.2.3. Japan 
Japan currently has two nuclear plants under construction, a 1000MW BWR reactor and a 
900MW PWR reactor.  The available cost estimates for Japan are shown in Table 6.7.  
These estimates are based on the forecast cost of constructing four ABWR (Advanced 
BWR) type models with a gross capacity each of 1350MW and therefore do not relate to 
currently constructing reactors.  They show that forecast costs in Japan are high relative to 
the other countries we consider. 
Table 6.7  
Projected Japanese Generation Costs under Varying Discount Rates 
Investment O&M Fuel Total
$/MWh $/MWh $/MWh $/MWh
2003 estimate (5%) 21.80 14.50 11.80 48.10
2003 estimate (10%) 42.40 14.50 11.80 68.60
1996 estimate (5%) 24.91 16.84 15.71 57.45
1996 estimate (10%) 47.76 17.05 14.76 79.57  
Source: Projected Costs of Generating Electricity, OECD 2005, 51-52 and Projected Costs of Generating Electricity, OECD 
2005, 67-69.  
Note; Capital costs include interest during construction, licensing and decommissioning.  The figures are in 1996 and 2003 
US$’s. 
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6.2.4. Re-started Construction 
In the following cases plants currently under construction represent the resumption of 
construction of part-completed reactors abandoned for a number of years.   
6.2.4.1. Russia 
The Russian nuclear investment program is reported to amount to around US$15 billion in 
2002 currency, of which US$ 9.7 billion is budgeted by 2010.  Some 35% of this budget was 
for upgrading and replacement capacity, 56% of it for new capacity.46 
All of the construction underway currently in Russia represents the resumption of 
construction of part-completed reactors abandoned for a decade or more. The reactors at 
Balakovo, Kalinin and Volgodonsk are V-32047 and the Kursk reactor is an RBMK (the same 
reactor type as Chernobyl). Completion of Kursk-5 is in doubt.    
The cost of completing partially built plant was estimated by the Federal Atomic Energy 
Agency (Rosatom) at an average cost of US$ 680/kW for the 9GWs of plant that were 
incomplete.  In comparison Rosatom estimated that the cost of building new nuclear plant 
was US$ 900/kW. 48   This is a low figure and it is not clear on what basis it has been 
calculated.  
6.2.4.2. Ukraine 
After the accident at the 4th reactor unit at Chernobyl, the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine 
adopted on 2 August 1990 a moratorium on building new nuclear power units in the Ukraine. 
The construction work at unit 6 at Zaporozhe was interrupted and the construction of 4 new 
WWER type reactors at Khmelnitski and Rovno was also halted.  The moratorium was lifted 
in October 1993.49  As a result of the lifting of the moratorium, the two plants at Khmelnitski 
are currently under construction again.   
6.2.4.3. Iran 
The construction of the Bushehr plant in Iran was restarted in 1995 following the signature of 
an agreement with Russia to complete construction of the plant.50 
                                               
46  World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power in Russia, September 2005 (http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf45.htm). 
47  The V-320 is a version of the Russian WWER pressurised water reactor. 
48  World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power in Russia, September 2005 (http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf45.htm).  
The source does not report whether or not interest during construction is included.  The currency basis is also not 
reported. 
49  IAEA, Country Nuclear Power Profiles, Ukraine, 2003. 
50  World Nuclear Association, Plans For New Reactors Worldwide, April 2005  
(http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf76.htm). 
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6.2.4.4. Romania 
On 31 August 2000 the former Government of Romania issued an Ordinance committing to 
the completion of the Cernovoda reactor on which construction was started in 1983.5152 
6.2.4.5. Argentina 
In 1979 Atucha-2 was ordered following a government decision to have four more units 
coming into operation 1987-97. It was a Siemens design, a larger version of unit 1, and 
construction started in 1981 by a joint venture of CNEA and Kraftwerk Union (KWU). 
However, work proceeded slowly due to lack of funds and was suspended in 1994 with the 
plant 81% complete.53 Construction has now been restarted.  
6.3. Finland 
In January 2002 the Finnish government approved an application by Teollisuuden Voima Oy 
(TVO) (a Finnish utility) to build a new reactor based primarily on economic criteria.   
The reactor selected for Olkiluoto 3 is the European Pressurised Water Reactor (EPR).  The 
electric capacity of the plant unit is approximately 1,600 MW.  A French-German Consortium 
formed by Framatome ANP and Siemens has total responsibility for the construction of the 
Olkiluoto 3 plant unit, with Framatome ANP in charge of the reactor plant and Siemens of the 
turbine plant.  Table 6.8 shows details of the plant now under construction. 
Table 6.8  
Nuclear Plants Under Construction, 2005 
Country Plant Name Type of Reactor Vendor Net Capacity Construction Started
Estimated Commercial 
Operation
Finland OLKILUOTO PWR Framatome 1600 MWe 12/08/2005 2009  
Source: IAEA, Power Reactor Information System, Last updated on 2005/09/1 and Ministry of Trade and Industry, Nuclear 
Energy in Finland, July 2005. 
                                               
51  IAEA, Country Nuclear Power Profiles, Romania, 2003. 
52  The Ordinance also sets out the financing sources of the project which include Nuclearelectrica’s (SNN) own sources, 
external loans based on sovereign guarantee and public funds from the Government. It also offered a set of financial 
incentives for the project including profit tax exemption, exemption from any import taxes due in Romania, Romanian 
income taxes exemption for foreign contractual partners, the payment of the accounts payable of SNN in respect of the 
sovereign guarantee for the external loans, contracted for the completion of Unit 1. 
53  World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power in Argentina, November 2004  
(http://world-nuclear.org/info/printable_information_papers/inf96print.htm). 
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Forecast Costs 
A study published in 2000 estimated that a new 1,250 MW nuclear power plant located at an 
existing site would cost €2.2 billion, including the interest during construction and initial fuel 
loading.  Assuming 8,000 hours annual full-load utilisation54 this corresponds to an electricity 
generation cost of €22/MWh.55  Table 6.9 sets out full details of cost estimates from the 
study: 
Table 6.9  
Performance and cost data for new baseload power plants in Finland 
 
2000 estimate
Electric power MWe 1250
Net efficiency rate % 35
Investment costs € million 2186
Investment cost per power output capacity €/kWe 1749
Fuel prices €/MWh 1.00
Fuel costs of electricity production €/MWhe 2.86
Annual fixed operation and maintenance costs % of investment 1.50
Variable operation and maintenance costs €/MWhe 3.41
Economic lifetime years 40
Interest rate % 5
Annuity factor % 5.828  
Source: Tarjanne and Rissanen, Nuclear Power: Least-Cost Option for Baseload Electricity in Finland, The Uranium 
Institute 25th Annual Symposium, 30 August – 1 September, Page 8.   
Note: The interest during construction is included in the investment cost. For the nuclear power plant, the initial fuel loading 
is included in the investment.  The interest rate used is a real rate of 5% per annum and the fixed price level of February 
2000 has been used. 
Further research in August 2003 reported by the World Nuclear Association put the cost of 
nuclear power at €23.7/MWh, on the basis of 91% capacity factor, 5% interest rate, and 40 
year plant life.56  The same study put the cost of coal at €28.1/MWh and natural gas at 
€32.3/MWh on the same basis).  Factoring in the impact of emissions trading (where the 
price of carbon is assumed to be €20/t CO2) the electricity prices for coal and gas increased 
to €44.3 and €39.2/MWh respectively. 
Research published by the IEA forecasts the costs of nuclear power in Finland both in two 
studies published in1998 and 2005.  The 2005 study forecasts the costs of a 1500MW PWR 
reactor whilst the 1998 study estimate was based on a 1,000MW BWR plant.  Table 6.10 
illustrates these costs in terms of $/MWh. 
                                               
54  The historical average nuclear capacity factor in Finland is 91%. 
55  Tarjanne and Rissanen, Nuclear Power: Least-Cost Option for Baseload Electricity in Finland, The Uranium Institute 
25th Annual Symposium, 30 August – 1 September, Page 7. 
56  World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Energy in Finland, June 2004, (http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf76.htm). The 
source does not report whether or not interest during construction is included.  The currency basis is also not reported. 
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Table 6.10 
Projected Finnish Generation Costs under Varying Discount Rates 
 
Investment O&M Fuel Total
$/MWh $/MWh $/MWh $/MWh
2003 estimate (5%) 16.30 6.10 5.10 27.50
2003 estimate (10%) 31.20 6.10 4.90 42.20
1996 estimate (5%) 22.01 7.95 7.32 37.28
1996 estimate (10%) 40.56 8.05 7.32 55.93  
Source: Projected Costs of Generating Electricity, OECD 2005, 51-52 and Projected Costs of Generating Electricity, OECD 
1998, 67-69.  
Note; Capital costs include interest during construction, licensing and decommissioning.  The figures are in 1996 and 2003 
US$’s. 
The 2003 costs shown in Table 6.10 are based on an overnight construction cost of 
US$1,895/kW, total fuel costs of US$5.13/MWh (falling to US$4.9 with a 10% discount rate) 
and O&M costs of US$48/kW (in 2010).57  Finland’s projected O&M costs were low relative 
to the other countries in the sample58 except France.  Finland was also the only country in 
the sample to assume an increase in fuel cycle costs.  All other counties assumed stable 
costs and historic data shows fuel cycle costs have been falling.59 
Forecast Costs Olikiluoto 
Existing Finnish cost forecasts do not include the EPR reactor type which is the design to be 
constructed at Olikiluoto.   
A forecast of the cost of an EPR reactor in France prepared by DGEMP (French Energy 
Directorate) is illustrated in section 6.2.2, Table 6.6.60  This forecast estimates that the 
capital cost will be €1,283/kW excluding interest during construction, lower than the 2003 
estimate of overnight construction costs for a PWR reactor.  However, this forecast is likely 
to be subject to errors as the reactor will be the first constructed of its kind.  In addition this 
forecast is based on construction of the plant in France, costs for construction in Finland 
could vary.   
Project Financing Olikiluoto 
TVO is buying the European Pressurised Water Reactor (EPR) to be constructed at 
Olikiluoto from Areva's Framatome ANP subsidiary under a turnkey contract.61, 62  TVO have 
                                               
57  International Energy Agency and the Nuclear Energy Agency, Projected Costs of Generating Electricity, OECD 2005, 
p.43-44. 
58  Canada, the US, Czech Republic, Germany, Netherlands, Slovak Republic, Switzerland, Japan. Korea and Romania. 
59  International Energy Agency and the Nuclear Energy Agency, Projected Costs of Generating Electricity, OECD 2005, 
p. 44. 
60  AREVA Corporate Strategy Department, Didier Beutier, EPR Background and its Role in Continental Europe, 
Westminster Energy Forum Thursday 23rd June 2005. 
61  A turnkey contract is a fixed price contract.  The consortium has total responsibility for the plant equipment and 
buildings, licensability and performance and time schedule.   
62  Nucleonics Week, Bids Give TVO A Range Of Choices For Fifth Finnish Reactor Project, 3 April 2003. 
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said the total price of the contract is "around" €3-billion, including first fuel core, a plant-
specific training simulator, and infrastructure.63 
Shareholders in the unit are expected to fund between 20-25% of the project the remaining 
funding being a mixture of loans and credit.64  For example, Fortum is expected to invest 
€185 million to obtain approximately 25% of the company.65  In all more than 60 Finnish 
companies will participate in the acquisition of the plant.66 
According to the European Renewable Energies Foundation (EREF) much of the remaining 
funding was arranged through a syndicated loan arranged by Bayerische Landesbank 
(which is owned by the state of Bavaria).67   
EREF state that Bayerische Landesbank (BLB) gave a €1.95 billion syndicated loan at an 
interest rate of 2.6% to TVO for the purchase of the Framantone EPR at a fixed price of €3.2 
billion.  EREF state that the loan is a syndicated revolving credit of €1.95 billion with two 
tranches maturing in 2009 and 2011 respectively.  They add that the other banks in the 
syndicate are Handelsbanken, Nordea, BNP Paribas and JP Morgan.68 
EREF also state that Areva received an export credit guarantee of over €610 million from the 
French export credit agency (COFACE) for the sale of the plant.   
EREF have lodged a formal complaint with reference to the loan and other aspects of the 
financing, with the European Commission under state aid, export credit, procurement, safety 
and other regulations.69  In summary they allege that: 
§ The syndicated loan was granted at a preferential interest rate of 2.6%. 
§ France’s Coface supplied a €610 million export credit guarantee covering Areva supplies. 
§ The Swedish Export Agency (SEK) provided generous financial support. 
§ Finnish municipal authorities have entered into long term purchase obligations at a 
specific price (in violation, they allege, of EU procurement rules). 
§ The Finnish EPR’s future electricity price will amount to ‘dumping’.70 
The European Commission (EC) has registered the complaint meaning it will open an 
investigation.  The procedure involves a preliminary investigation by the directorate, followed 
                                                
63  Nucleonics Week, European 'green power' generators challenge EPR's competitiveness, 16 December 2004. 
64  Nucleonics Week, Vendor credits to cover 80% of TVO reactor, 23/10/2005 and Shareholders leap at chance for stake 
in new Finnish unit, 27/11/03. 
65  Nucleonics Week, Nuclear still seen as Finland's best bet for new baseload power, 19 May 2004. 
66  TVO press release, Olkiluoto 3 investment decision made - European pressurised water reactor supply contract signed, 
19/12/2003.  
67  EREF have issued an action before the European Commission calling for an investigation into aspects of the financing 
of the project, see EREF, Press Declaration, EU investigation requested into illegal aid to Finnish nuclear plant, 
13/12/04. 
68  EREF, Press Declaration, EU investigation requested into illegal aid to Finnish nuclear plant, 13/12/04. 
69  The complaint was lodged on 14th December 2004. 
70  World Nuclear Association, The European Commission (EC) is to investigate the construction of Finland’s, News 
Briefing 03-11 and Nucleonics Week, European ‘green power’ generators challenge EPR’s competitiveness, 27/11/03. 
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by a decision on whether there are grounds to believe state aid was involved.  If the EC does 
find grounds formal procedures will be launched.71 
Electricity Sale Agreements 
TVO is a public-private partnership company, 43% government-owned (including 27% 
owned by Fortum) and 57% private.   
In all more than 60 Finnish companies will participate in the acquisition of the new plant.72  
The owners of the new company will then take their shares of electricity at cost, any 
unwanted portion being sold by them into the Nordic market.  The private owners are mostly 
heavy industry with a high demand for base-load power.73  Bids to TVO for shares of the 
1600 MW output totalled 2000 MW. 74  
However, according to EREF some of the participants, in particular a Finnish communal 
authority, will sign a long-term obligation to purchase electricity at a fixed price. 75 
6.4. China 
Table 6.11 shows the nuclear plants that are currently under construction in China, and 
Table 6.12 illustrates possible nuclear power plant orders over the next 2-3 years. 
Table 6.11  
Nuclear Plants Under Construction, 2005 
Country Plant Name Type of Reactor Net Capacity Construction Started
Estimated Commercial 
Operation
China TIANWAN WWER 1000 MWe 20/10/1999 N/A
China TIANWAN WWER 1000 MWe 20/10/2000 N/A  
Source; IAEA, Power Reactor Information System and Steve Thomas, The economics of nuclear power: analysis of recent 
studies, July 2005, PSIRU, Page 6. 
Table 6.12  
Possible Nuclear Plants orders in the next 2-3 years 
Country Site Bidders Need Possible order date Forecast completion
China Sanmen 
BNFL/Westinghouse 
(AP1000), Russia 2x1000MW 2005/06 N/A
China Yangjiang 
BNFL/Westinghouse 
(AP1000), Russia 2x1000MW 2005/06 N/A  
Source; Steve Thomas, The economics of nuclear power: analysis of recent studies, July 2005, PSIRU, Page 6. 
The Tianwan projects are based in Lianyungang City, Jiangsu Province, 300 km north of 
Shanghai. The project includes two Russian advanced VVER-1000 91-Type PWR units with 
                                                
71 Nucleonics Week, EC will investigate 'green power' complaint of state aid to TVO EPR, 13 January 2005.  
72  TVO website, Olkiluoto 3 investment decision made - European pressurized water reactor supply contract signed. 
73   World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Energy in Finland, September 2005  
(http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf76.htm). 
74   World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Energy in Finland, September 2005  
(http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf76.htm). 
75  EREF, Press Declaration, EU investigation requested into illegal aid to Finnish nuclear plant, 13/12/04. 
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1,060 MW of installed capacity each.  Russia will supply the design of the project and the 
main equipment although some of equipment will be procured from third parties.  The 
Chinese party is responsible for civil engineering, erection and project management. The 
first concrete was poured in October 1999. Unit 1 and unit 2 were scheduled to complete for 
commercial operation by the end of 2004 and 2005, respectively but are both still under 
construction.76 
In addition to the two plants currently under construction, it has been reported that two plants 
(each with two 1000MW units) may be ordered in the next 2-3 years.   
Forecast Costs 
There is very little publicly available information on the cost of Chinese nuclear power 
projects.  The most recent set of comprehensive forecasts we have found were published by 
the IEA in 1998.  They are set out in Table 6.13. 
Table 6.13  
Projected Chinese Generation Costs under Varying Discount Rates 
Investment O&M Fuel Total
$/MWh $/MWh $/MWh $/MWh
Phase 2 Qinshan Project (5%) 12.12 5.69 7.56 25.37
Lingao Project (5%) 17.14 5.84 7.83 30.81
Phase 3 Qinshan Project (5%) 15.82 7.84 3.03 26.29
Phase 2 Qinshan Project (10%) 25.69 5.76 7.56 39.01
Lingao Project (10%) 36.92 5.91 7.83 50.67
Phase 3 Qinshan Project (10%) 32.96 8.38 3.03 44.37  
Source: Projected Costs of Generating Electricity, OECD 2005, 51-52 and Projected Costs of Generating Electricity, OECD 
1998, 67-69.   
Note; Capital costs include interest during construction, licensing and decommissioning.  The figures are in 1996 US$’s. 
The Lingao project comprised two PWR reactors each with a capacity of 1,000MW.  The 
plants began construction in 1997 and were completed in 2002.  The Qinshan project 
comprised two 600MW PWR reactors in the second phase and two 700MW Candu reactors 
in the third phase.  The Qinshan 2 reactors started construction in 1996/97 and completed in 
2002/04.77 
Of these three projects Qinshan phase 2 was predominantly ‘home made’(using 
independently developed Chinese technology) and this is said to explain its lower investment 
cost per/kW.78 
The estimates are based on feasibility studies and are expressed in 1996 prices.  The 
construction costs for the Qinshan 2 project were later re-estimated due to the effect of high 
                                                
76  IAEA, Power Reactor Information System, 2005. 
77  IAEA, Power Reactor Information System, 2004. 
78  International Energy Agency and the Nuclear Energy Agency, Projected Costs of Generating Electricity, OECD 1998, 
105-106. 
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inflation and interest rates on the projects costs.  The re-adjusted base costs79 were 
US$1,465 and US$1534kW respectively.80  
General cost estimates have also been reported by some industry sources in China.  These 
sources indicate that for some foreign joint venture projects, the cost may be about 
US$50/MWh or more.81  At prevailing exchange rates, these estimates are higher than the 
IEA forecasts published in 1998.  This may indicate either an increase in the cost of nuclear 
power since those forecasts82 or an underestimation of costs in the feasibility studies to 
which the IEA data refers.   
Concurrently the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) Chief Executives have 
asserted that the company’s CNP-1000 PWR could be built at a cost under US$1,300 
per/kW for an installed plant.83  This figure has been used as a benchmark for future bids 
from foreign vendors.84 This figure is not inconsistent with the IEA estimates published in 
1998 (which forecast that the Qinshan 2 reactors would cost US$1,465 and US$1534kW 
respectively).  However, it is low relative to the industry sources quoted who have said that it 
is not a credible figure.85   
By way of comparison the IEA estimated in a study published in 2005 that for most plants in 
the sample of countries that participated86 overnight construction costs vary between 
US$1000 and US$2000/kW whilst levelised costs vary between US$21-US$31/MWh based 
on a 5% discount rate.87   
Issues in Cost Comparison in China 
One reason for which the CNNC estimate may not be perceived to be a credible figure is 
that Chinese cost estimates reportedly may fail to apply a discount rate or account for 
depreciation.   
                                               
79  Base costs include expenses at leading time including land cost and site preparation cost, equipment purchasing, 
transportation and insurance fee, construction and erection costs, costs of design, engineering and services, project 
management costs, start-up cost, two thirds (for PWR) or total (for PHWR) the cost of nuclear fuel of the first core and 
contingency allowance. 
80  International Energy Agency and the Nuclear Energy Agency, Projected Costs of Generating Electricity, OECD 1998, 
105-106. 
81  Nucleonics Week, State official suggests China may adopt two-track technology policy, 30 June 2005.  The source does 
not indicate the price base for the estimate or the specific items included. 
82  However, the other countries we have considered (Japan, France and Finland), except for Romania, have all 
experienced a fall in the total costs of nuclear power between 1998 and 2005. 
83  CNNC has developed the indigenous CNP-1000 PWR based on existing Framatome plants at Daya Bay and Ling Ao. 
The source does not indicate the price base for the estimate or the specific items included. 
84  Nucleonics Week, Chinese investment accounting pressures foreign PWR bidders, 11 August 2005. 
85  Nucleonics Week, Chinese investment accounting pressures foreign PWR bidders, 11 August 2005. 
86  The counties in the sample are Canada, the USA, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Slovakia, Switzerland, Japan, Korea, and Romania. 
87  International Energy Agency and the Nuclear Energy Agency, Projected Costs of Generating Electricity, OECD 2005, 
51-52 and International Energy Agency and the Nuclear Energy Agency, Projected Costs of Generating Electricity, 
OECD 2005, P.43-45.  Note; this study is based on 2003 prices. 
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According to a report by Nucleonics Week88 the Chinese system does not even refer to the 
average generating cost over a projects lifetime.  Instead generation costs are calculated 
annually.  The sales price is then calculated simply by dividing required revenue for any 
period by estimated generation.  The rate of return to investors is calculated at between 10 
and 15% of the selling price of power (the source does not specify if this figure is real or 
nominal).   
The report also points out that the Chinese generation cost equation does not include taxes 
and dividend payments despite the fact that the electricity price is calculated using these 
factors.  This further complicates comparison of Chinese generation cost figures. 
Financing 
According to the CNNC, China plans to spend nearly $50 billion on nuclear energy by 2020. 
That would add roughly 30 new power plants to the 11 reactors China already operates or is 
building.89 
Reportedly only CNNC and Guangdong Nuclear Power Group are permitted to develop 
nuclear projects.   The five national independent power groups are theoretically only allowed 
to be minority investors.90    
Two indigenous nuclear projects illustrate this ownership structure: 
1. The Ling Dong project (two 1,000MW PWR reactors of Chinese design at Ling Dong) 
was expected to be owned through a holding company of which CNNC would own 45%, 
Guangdong province would own 45% share and the remaining 10% would be controlled 
by investors from China's electrical engineering sector. 91   
2. Similarly for the next phase of the indigenous Qinshan PWR program, CNNC was 
expected to take a 51% share in a holding company responsible for that project. A 
provincial government body would control some of the shares in the remaining 49% of 
the project.92   
There is no publicly available information about the financing of these indigenous plants.  
However, plants which are built to foreign designs have been subject to an open bidding 
process for both construction and financing.   
The Sanmen and Yangjiang plants were subject to an open bidding process by the CNNC 
and China Guangdong Nuclear Power Co respectively.  The bids were for third-generation 
designs, with contracts being awarded in 2005. Westinghouse bid its AP 1000 (which now 
has US NRC final design approval), Areva (Framatome ANP) bid it’s EPR of 1600 MW and 
Atomstroyexport bid its V-392 version of VVER-1000. 93  
                                               
88  Nucleonics Week, Chinese investment accounting pressures foreign PWR bidders, 11 August 2005. 
89  USA Today, Nuclear industry hopes to capitalize on surge in China, 18 August 2005. 
90  South China Morning Post, Datang accelerates renewable power drive, 31 August 2005. 
91  Nucleonics Week, Four more indigenous PWRs set for Guangdong, Qinshan, CNNC says, 22 April 2004. 
92  Nucleonics Week, Four more indigenous PWRs set for Guangdong, Qinshan, CNNC says, 22 April 2004. 
93  World Nuclear Org, Nuclear Power in China, September 2005. 
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In its request for bids the CNNC also requested financing terms.  The US Export-Import bank 
approved $5 billion in loan guarantees for the Westinghouse bid, and the French Coface 
company was expected similarly to finance Areva for Framatome ANP's bid.94  
Westinghouse’s bid is reported to price its state-of-the-art AP1,000 PWRs at $2.2 billion to 
$2.7 billion a pair.95 
                                               
94  World Nuclear Org, Nuclear Power in China, September 2005. 
95  Asia Times, US's $5 billion nuclear gamble with China, Kaushik Kapisthalam. 
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7. Financing Mechanisms and Potential Market Impacts 
7.1. Past Financing Mechanisms for Nuclear Power 
In the 1988 White Paper on Privatising Electricity96 the proposal for a statutory obligation on 
Regional Electricity Suppliers (RECs) to contract for a specified minimum of non-fossil-
fuelled generating capacity was first introduced.  Subsequently implemented as the Non-
Fossil Fuel Obligation (the NFFO), the obligation provided a guaranteed additional income to 
certain types of capacity, primarily nuclear, to facilitate their privatisation97. 
At that time it was envisaged that the RECs would contract for the majority of the NFFO 
capacity from nuclear power.  However there were no restrictions on the source of the 
capacity and some capacity was also expected to come from renewables such as wind and 
tidal power.  When established the NFFO was set to operate until 1998, with a review in 
1994 of the requirement to extend the obligation until 1998. 
In order to ensure the RECs were not disadvantaged by the NFFO the additional cost of 
non-fossil fuel generation was to be recovered through a levy (termed the fossil fuel levy) 
made on almost all electricity sales in England and Wales.   
The NFFO obligation was discharged through what was called the Primary Nuclear Contract 
between Nuclear Electric and the Non-Fossil Fuel Purchasing Agency (an organisation set 
up by the RECs to administer the NFFO).  The contract set up in April 1990 granted the 
NFPA exclusive rights to all the nuclear plant capacity of Nuclear Electric.  In return Nuclear 
Electric received the Pool price for all electricity sold plus a premium (based on the levy) to 
be paid directly by the NFPA based on a maximum specified in the contract.   
In 1994 Nuclear Electric forecast that the aggregate value of premium income that it would 
receive over the life of the contract was equivalent to £9.4billion in March 1994 values98.  
The £9.4billion is the sum of 1990-1998 expectations. NFFO was finally eliminated in 1998 
but was reduced after 1996 because the privatised British Energy did not receive any money 
via the Obligation. 
Since the first NFFO, four additional obligations have been imposed (NFFO-2, 3, 4 & 5) in 
1991, 1994, 1997 and 1998.  These subsequent NFFOs were designed not to provide 
additional revenue to nuclear capacity, but to secure capacity from new renewables projects, 
and the support to nuclear generation through the NFFO was finally eliminated at the end of 
1998.99  
                                               
96  Privatising Electricity, The Government’s proposals for the privatisation of the electricity supply industry in England 
and Wales, HMSO London, February 1998. 
97  The NFFO applied in England and Wales, but parallel arrangements operated in Scotland and Northern Ireland.  
98  Nuclear Electric, The Government’s Review of Nuclear Energy; Submission from Nuclear Electric plc; The Nuclear 
Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation and the Levy, September 1994, Page3. 
99  Department of Trade and Industry, Promoting Renewable Energy: Experience with the NFFO, 16 September 1999, 
Page 3. 
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7.2. Financing Options 
It seems reasonable to conclude that no UK government in the foreseeable future would 
sanction a nuclear power station as a public sector project.  This would be seen as providing 
inadequate incentives for efficiency, and as an inappropriate role for government in a 
liberalised energy market.  However it is not possible to forecast with any confidence how 
financing by the private sector would be structured. 
The two broad private-sector approaches to financing such a project are likely to be: 
§ corporate finance, on the balance sheet of the promoter (in this case probably an 
electricity generating company), or possibly a partnership; or  
§ non-recourse project finance, where the project is established as a separate legal entity.   
Corporate finance is much simpler, although it generally requires a substantial equity input 
from the promoter, with typically less than half the capital raised by bank or bond financed 
debt.  Project finance is in contrast very complex, but it normally protects the promoters from 
the threat of bankruptcy if the project fails, and it allows a higher level of debt, perhaps 75 
per cent or even more, as the lenders can define their risks more precisely.100  The 
promoters in this case would most likely include an electricity generator, construction 
companies, other major suppliers and perhaps financiers.  
It is not clear which of these alternatives (or some hybrid) would be chosen for financing a 
UK nuclear plant.   
It is conceivable that a nuclear power plant would be seen as too risky for financiers to 
support project financing, whereas a major generator might proceed with corporate finance.  
Or, conversely, project finance may be the only feasible alternative; or both might be feasible, 
leaving the potential corporate financier with a strategic decision, having regard to risk, 
financing costs and degree of control.  The outcome would depend critically on aspects of 
government policy and on corporate and financier confidence in future policy.  However, 
especially given the development in the UK of a strong tradition of project financing with 
some government involvement (as in multi billion pound PFI projects, for example in defence, 
and more commercial contexts, such as London Underground and the Channel Tunnel Rail 
Link), some such arrangement seems most likely for a new nuclear plant.  It might or might 
not be described formally as a Public Private Partnership (PPP). 
In either case, contracts would be designed to allocated risks as far as practicable to those 
in a position to control them.  And in either case, after completion of construction and 
commissioning, there would normally be refinancing of the original debt, to enjoy the lower 
interest rates that would now be acceptable to lenders, the risks of default being then much 
less.  
The public interest and hence the case for government involvement stems from two quite 
different sets of issues.  One is that nuclear power has external impacts which would not fall 
on the private sector promoters.  Some of these are positive (improving security of supply 
                                               
100  An advantage of debt from the commercial perspective is that interest payments (in contrast to dividends) are treated as 
a cost to set against corporate tax.  This commercial advantage is not of course a welfare advantage, since the saving to 
the project is a cost to taxpayers.  However it would be unrealistic to make adjustments for this in comparing alternative 
generation costs, and we believe the effect would be small relative to the uncertainties in many other more important 
factors.  
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and reducing greenhouse gas emissions) and others negative (such as risks of radiation 
exposure from the plant or its subsequent waste).  The government might consider that 
these impacts on balance merit some public support.  The other set of issues is that the 
government itself, via its regulatory regimes, is a major player in determining the risks faced 
by electricity generators.  In particular, the current electricity regulatory regime is geared to 
incentivise short to medium term efficiency (and renewables), not long term stability or 
security.  Other major regulatory impacts are the land use planning system, and the nuclear 
licensing regime (although no government would intervene in the latter, beyond establishing 
competent regulatory authorities with adequate powers).  Thus the government might 
consider that there are ways in which these regimes might be modified that would better 
serve the public interest and would also improve the commercial feasibility of new nuclear 
build. 
Government measures to reflect external benefits of new nuclear generation might take one 
or more of several possible measures.  These might be direct financial incentives, such as 
tax allowances101, or direct grants, probably financed at least in part by electricity 
consumers.102  Such support might apply to construction, or to operation, or to the initial 
costs associated with the planning inquiry or, much more substantially, the licensing.  Or 
they might include less direct financial support such as government guarantees of some 
bank or bond financing.103 
The most important of possible government measures to adapt the regulatory regimes would 
be to reduce the market uncertainty, by, for example, underwriting or requiring some 
minimum level of procurement of electricity from the new station over a long period.  A 
recent but still embryonic variant of this general idea for support is that of carbon contracts104, 
in which Government (specifically the Treasury) would auction off future carbon savings to 
the lowest bidder, thus potentially helping create a longer-term carbon market than the EU 
ETS can offer.  
Such support might be financed in part by a contractual agreement with the government to 
share some of the gains which would arise on refinancing, if and when the project is 
successfully built and commissioned.105  
                                               
101  The US Energy Policy Act of 2005 includes a tax credit of 1.8 cents per kWh for the first eight years of production 
from new nuclear power plants (Neff, Shirley (2005) Review of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Center for Energy, 
Marine Transportation and Public Policy, Columbia University 2005). 
102  The Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO), approved by the European Commission for 8 years in 1990, imposed an 
obligation on the then Regional Electricity Companies to buy a certain amount of electricity from non-fossil sources, 
any excess cost being met by a so-called Fossil Fuel Levy on all electricity sales.  The scheme was established to 
overcome the problem that the market was unwilling to buy the existing nuclear power stations, with their prospective 
high decommissioning costs.  However the NFFO was subsequently used also to support the development of renewable 
sources.  After it ended in 1998 the levy continued, to support previous renewable contracts let under the NFFO, but 
these arrangements have now been superseded by the Renewables Obligation, under which electricity suppliers are 
required to source specified percentages of their electricity from renewable sources.  There is no current provision to 
support nuclear generation.  
103  This would reduce the commercial cost of capital, but would of course be transferring some of the risk of default to 
taxpayers and this would be a social cost.  It could however produce a net national benefit as, besides protecting the 
private financers for the debt from the potential cost of default, it would also reduce uncertainty about the likelihood of 
this happening and reduce uncertainty about political support for the project.  
104  D. Helm and C. Hepburn Carbon contracts and energy policy: an outline proposal  Oxford 6 October 2005 
105  This device has been pressed for some years by the NAO in the context of PFI projects (e.g. Finlay, David Exploring 
the financing options, The PFI Journal, Issue 50. 2005, pp 10-12), following some failures, in earlier years, of public 
sector bodies to recognise that such gains would arise. 
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A potential source of confusion and disagreement is the social valuation of major back-end 
expenditure by the private promoters, on decommissioning and perhaps waste disposal.  We 
address the conceptual issues that arise in Appendix 1.  In commercial appraisals it is 
commonly, and reasonably assumed that a fund is built up over the lifetime of a privately 
financed nuclear plant, which is subsequently drawn down to pay for the back-end expenses 
for which the supplier is liable.  The commercial financial calculation will build this into the 
cost of the output.  However the low risk market rate (essentially the government borrowing 
rate) at which the fund is assumed to accumulate will typically be lower than most estimates 
of social time preference.  From a public interest perspective it would be strictly correct to 
discount the back-end spending financed in this way at the social time preference rate, 
which would reduce the estimated social cost.106  In practice this would seem an 
unreasonable complication as general rule, but there may be a public interest case for 
checking, from time to time, whether the more rigorous analysis would have a material effect. 
7.2.1. Financing and the cost of capital for privately-financed nuclear 
spending 
As we have shown earlier in this report, the cost of electricity from any future nuclear station 
will depend very substantially on the cost of capital, which defines, for practical purposes107, 
the discount rate for redistributing the expenditures over time (for example to calculate a 
cost/kWh).  However, as we note in Appendix 1, this cost of capital cannot be forecast with 
any precision.  It depends upon many technical and behavioural factors which would only 
emerge as the proposal is developed. 
Estimates can, however, be made of the return on capital, or ‘internal rate of return’, that 
would be obtained, given various assumptions about capital, operating and maintenance and 
decommissioning costs, and about the price at which the station output might be sold.  Such 
estimates can be compared with estimates of what expected return on capital might be 
needed to attract private financing.  This is the approach adopted by OXERA (2005) in their 
note on costs of nuclear new build.  Estimates of what return would be needed to attract 
finance can in turn be used to estimate the cost of nuclear power and the action that may be 
needed by government to make financing feasible. 
Notwithstanding all these uncertainties, some estimate of the private sector cost of capital is 
needed to estimate the cost of electricity from a new nuclear plant.  It can be said with 
confidence that this cost of capital would not be less than the rates of return108 allowed on 
the regulatory asset base of the regulated electricity industry.  The rates currently set by 
Ofgem are 6.5 per cent in real terms for a public electricity supplier and for the distribution 
network operators and 6.25 per cent in real terms for the national grid company.  What 
premium above this would be needed by the market to finance a nuclear plant, for a 
                                                
106  The difference between the social time preference rate and the government borrowing rate means that there is some 
extra cost of public borrowing at the margin, not reflected in the market rate, or a corresponding social benefit from 
saving such as that for a decommissioning fund.  
107  The privately financed cost of capital is the sum of the risk free rate (i.e. the cost of government debt), plus a risk 
premium.  The risk premium is a social cost, but the risk free rate is a little lower than values typically derived for social 
time preference.  This introduces a difference between strict social welfare costs and financial costs, and could be of 
practical concern if a comparison were being made between publicly and privately financed sources of supply.  
However, where the alternatives being compared are essentially privately financed, social time preference is not a 
material issue.  In the nuclear case it is potentially relevant in practice only to some costs or benefits falling outside the 
commercial financial calculation, as we discuss below. 
108  These rates of return are defined in terms of the weighted average cost of capital (WACC), taking account of debt and 
equity financing. 
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plausible degree of government support as discussed above, is a matter for bold judgment.  
In the long term, if a nuclear programme became established, it might be no more than a 
percentage point.  But initially a substantially higher premium, perhaps in the region of 2 to 3 
percentage points, seems more plausible (i.e. a premium of some 7 percentage points 
above the risk free rate).  This implies that, in deriving a cost per kWh from a set of capital 
costs and operating costs, a discount rate of around 9 per cent in real terms might be 
appropriate.  (This is simply to reflect the financing costs, and assumes that any appropriate 
adjustments for potential time or cost overruns have already been made.)   
7.2.2. Discounting and Costing of Publicly-Financed Spending and of 
Externalities  
Any government support for nuclear power is unlikely to include substantial public grants or 
loans to the nuclear supplier.  However the financial cost of public loans would be recovered 
from the price of the output in the same way as other debt, and it would seem most sensible 
to treat them as simply another source of debt finance.  Grants would not of course be 
reflected in the output price, but would be need to be handled in any analysis of the social 
cost of nuclear power as one of many social costs and benefits that do not appear as such in 
the commercial financial estimates. 
7.3. Electricity Market Issues 
On the assumption that any new nuclear power plant would have to operate within the 
context of the prevailing electricity wholesale market arrangements, it is important to 
consider the potential implications of such market arrangements for investment in new 
nuclear plant.   
The current wholesale electricity market arrangements, known as the British Electricity 
Trading and Transmission Arrangements (BETTA), have two central features: 
§ electricity is traded bi-laterally between buyers and sellers, under contract terms agreed 
between the parties; generators can sell their output under contract to retailers or large 
consumers, over the counter, or through power exchanges; and 
§ a balancing market that allows the system operator to buy or sell energy close to real 
time, to maintain system balance. 
Experience shows that generators typically sell the majority of their output through the bi-
lateral contract market, in order to avoid the less predictable prices in the balancing market. 
System demand varies continuously throughout the day and over the course of the year.  
Both within day and over the year the overall scope of variation can be very large.  Figure 
7.1 shows daily load curves for the summer minimum and winter maximum days, and also 
the typical summer and winter days.  This data indicates that within the year 2004/5, summer 
minimum demand fell towards 20 GW, while the winter maximum demand rose to almost 60 
GW.   
At the present time, the total capacity of the nuclear plants in England and Wales is around 
9.5 GW, which is less than half the current minimum system demand.  Moreover, the current 
expectations on plant retirements are that the available nuclear capacity will begin declining 
from 2006-7, and that: 
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§ the whole of the 2.4 GW of Magnox capacity will be taken out of service by 2010/11109; 
and 
§ All of the current 5.9 GW of AGR capacity will be taken out of service by 2023.110  
Figure 7.1 
GB Summer and Winter Daily Demand Profiles in 2004/05 
 
Source:  NationalGrid 2005 Seven Year Statement 
The variation in load over time can also be shown more systematically in the form of a load 
duration curve, which plots the percentage of time that total demand is at different levels.  
This is shown in Figure 7.2 for 2004. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
109  NationalGrid Seven Year Statement 2005. 
110  Hansard, House of Lords, 24 February 2005, column WA232 
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Figure 7.2 
Annual Load Duration Curve for 2004 
 
Source:  NationalGrid 2005 Seven Year Statement 
Because of the substantial variability in demand, wholesale market prices also vary 
substantially, according to the time of the day and season of the year.  For example, in 2005, 
balancing market prices on a typical winter day varied from just over £17 per MWh (1.7p per 
kWh), to over £44 per MWh (4.4p per kWh).  On a typical summer’s day, the lowest daily 
prices were a little over £17 per MWh, and rose up to over £42 per MWh.   
Market participants can seek to avoid these large price variations by means of bilateral 
contracts of varying length, and energy purchasers will generally seek to enter contracts that 
can provide generation to match their anticipated demand variations.  Contract prices 
themselves can vary widely, depending on contract characteristics.  For example, Table 7.1 
shows recent UK Power Exchange prices for base load, peak load, and off-peak contracts.  
Apart from illustrating the strong recovery in power prices that has occurred over the last 
several years, this shows the significant commercial advantage that can be derived from the 
ability to offer power other than at base load. 
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Table 7.1 
Electricity Contract Prices by Contract Type (£/MWh) 
Year Quarter Base 
Load 
Peak Off-peak 
2003 1 17.41 21.50 15.15 
2003 2 15.21 18.03 13.64 
2003 3 18.70 27.30 13.88 
2003 4 22.06 27.10 19.25 
2004 1 20.62 24.63 18.40 
2004 2 19.57 23.57 17.36 
2004 3 21.01 24.59 19.02 
2004 4 24.50 30.11 21.35 
2005 1 30.12 37.35 26.14 
2005 2 31.56 37.56 28.12 
     
Source: UK Power Exchange and NERA calculations 
The large range of variation in both electricity demand and price over time means that a 
generator able to provide a flexible level of output is likely to fare better in this wholesale 
market than a generator whose output is largely fixed111.  Flexible and predictable plants 
provide a natural hedge against the short-term market risks.  A generator with relatively 
inflexible output, like the existing nuclear plants, may be constrained to offer contract sales 
only to the lower-value base load market, or may need to expose itself to the balancing 
market in order to offer more flexible contracts. 
The overall effect of these wholesale market features is that nuclear generation plant are 
less well suited to meeting present wholesale market requirements than, say, modern more  
flexible CCGT plant, and the average price per MWh at which a nuclear plant can sell its 
output is likely to be less112.  Some mitigation to these market issues for nuclear generation 
may be possible in the future, if new technology allows more flexible operation of future 
plants. 
Critics of the current wholesale market arrangements (and their predecessor NETA) have 
argued that the specific pricing rules that operate can impose on inflexible plants commercial 
penalties that exceed the opportunity cost imposed by the plant’s operational limitations.  In 
that case, modification of these rules so that imbalance charges more closely reflect 
opportunity costs would potentially be beneficial to nuclear plant, and could improve the 
                                                
111  It is also beneficial to be able to offer a predictable level of output, which can be an issue for some forms of renewable 
generation 
112  Somewhat similar issues exist for certain types of renewable generation, though in that case there may be additional 
issues arising from their inherently unpredictable output levels, depending on the technology type. 
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efficiency of the market.  Beyond changes of that sort, further measures would clearly be 
possible that could be beneficial to nuclear power, but careful consideration would need to 
be given to their effect on market efficiency.   
7.3.1. Mechanisms to Encourage Investments in Nuclear Plants 
The previous section referred to the possibilities for modifying the market rules to improve 
the position of nuclear plants.  In addition to changes to the market rules, there are clearly 
other ways in which general market conditions could be changed to enhance the position of 
nuclear plants.  Particular examples of this kind of measures would be to: 
§ impose on all licensed suppliers113 an obligation to buy a certain proportion of their 
energy from nuclear generators or low carbon sources more generally, thus creating an 
artificial demand for electricity from that source; 
§ modify the system dispatch rules in such a way that preference is given to the use of 
nuclear plants. 
Though both of these measures would be possible, they may be viewed as undesirable for 
market efficiency reasons.  First is the fact that all such measures are likely to create 
significant distortions in the electricity market, and so reduce the efficiency of the market and 
increase costs to consumers.  Secondly, preferential treatment for nuclear generators may 
be challenged for two major reasons: 
1. The electricity market in Britain, as in other EU countries, is required to operate in 
compliance with the EU Directives114 on electricity markets, which contain various 
measures designed to ensure market liberalisation and competition at wholesale and 
retails levels.  In particular the Directives require that generation plants be operated on 
the basis of merit order dispatch, and only allow preferential treatment for: (i) generation 
plants fired by indigenous fuel sources, and (ii) renewable generation plants.  So, it 
would appear that any scheme that gave preferential treatment to nuclear plant would be 
in breach of the Directives.   
2. In addition to this difficulty with the Directives, measures that place nuclear generation 
plant in an unduly favourable commercial position would risk being in breach of the 
Commission rules on state aids, as has been alleged by EREF to be the case in Finland 
at the moment.  
                                               
113  Licensed suppliers are those licensed to sell electricity to final consumers. 
114  The key Directive is the Electricity Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning 
common rules for the internal market in electricity was passed on 26 June 2003.  It repealed Directive 96/92/EC.  
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7.3.2. Market Implications of a Large-Scale Nuclear Power Programme 
As noted earlier, the existing nuclear powered generating plants in the UK tend to be 
relatively inflexible in that they cannot increase and decrease their outputs as quickly as 
other types of plants, particularly thermal plants.  This means that current nuclear plants are 
less able to provide the capability to follow load that other plant types have, at least to some 
degree.  With a relatively small proportion of nuclear plant in the national plant portfolio this 
need not bring difficulties, as their total generating capacity is generally below the troughs of 
demand, and so the rest of the load curve is filled by more flexible plants.  However, if the 
proportion of nuclear plants increased markedly, the position could arise where there would 
be insufficient flexibility in the system to match demand effectively at all points in the load 
curve.  This could be a particular problem at times of low demand, and measures might have 
to be taken to cope with this inflexibility.  In practice, the scale of any such problems seems 
unlikely to be significant in the UK context within the foreseeable future, since, as noted 
above: 
§ the total capacity of nuclear plants in England and Wales is around 9.5 GW, that is less 
than half of the current minimum system demand summer minimum of over 20 GW; 
§ current expectations on nuclear plant retirements mean that the available nuclear 
capacity will begin declining from 2006-7, and that the whole of the 2.4 GW of Magnox 
capacity will be taken out of service by 2010/11, with all the 5.9 GW of AGR capacity 
being taken out of service by 2023. 
Nevertheless, it would be desirable for an assessment of the impact of new nuclear 
investments on the market to be carried out, in the light of any investment programme that is 
developed.  
7.3.3. Impacts of Investment in Nuclear Power on Other Sources of 
Electricity Supply 
References are sometimes made to the “opportunity cost” of a nuclear investment 
programme, where what is meant is that there are knock-on effects of a nuclear programme 
on other types of non-thermal generation.  This is not an issue of opportunity cost in the strict 
sense in which the term is used in economic analysis, but the general argument 
nevertheless needs to be considered.  It is likely that any increase in investment activity in 
one generation technology will impact on other technologies.  Plans for new nuclear 
generation can therefore be expected to depress the market’s appetite for new CCGT 
investment relative to what it otherwise would be, possibly on a MW for MW basis.  With 
respect specifically to the effect on investment in renewables generation, there appear to be 
four main areas where concerns have been raised: 
1. Diversion of Government finance away from renewable investment:  it may be the case 
that the Government would only be willing to devote certain limited funds to efforts to 
incentivise power generation from non-fossil sources, whether this be nuclear or 
renewable.  If that is so, then there would probably be a trade off between funding of 
nuclear power and funding of renewables.  In that sense, it may be the case that 
increased investment in nuclear generation will “crowd out” renewable investment.  
However the objectives of promoting renewable sources are their contribution to 
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reducing emissions and to diversity and security of supply.115  The rationale for measures 
such as the renewables obligation is partly that these contributions are external benefits, 
not reflected in the price at which they could sell electricity in an unregulated market, and 
that these are new industries which also merit extra support on that account.  None of 
these objectives or rationales should be materially affected by nuclear power.  Plausible 
national emissions targets into the long term future will remain tight with or without 
nuclear power.  And public sector support for nuclear power would most likely be in 
forms which did not in budgetary terms compete directly with that for renewable sources.  
2. Reduction in the market’s appetite for investment in renewables:  we described earlier in 
this report ways in which the market may find the private financing of nuclear power 
plants more difficult than conventional power plant.  Similarly, private investment in 
renewable generation presents difficulties for private investors that are not present with 
fossil fuel plant.  If it is assumed that the relevant private investors have only a limited 
appetite for the financing of such fossil fuel plants, then it may be the case that “crowding 
out” of renewables may occur as a result of additional nuclear investments.  Once again, 
this is a matter where, in the confines of this cost study, it is only possible for us to 
speculate about what might happen in practice.  However given the international interest 
in financing electricity generation it is perhaps unlikely that the existence or otherwise of 
a UK nuclear programme would have any material impact on the availability of finance 
for other sources. 
3. Issues of impact on microgeneration: not all microgeneration investment will be 
renewable, but there has been recent interest in the subject, including a DTI consultation.  
The main questions here are the extent to which there would need to be radical changes 
to the configuration of distribution networks to accommodate microgeneration and 
whether large nuclear investments would make such developments less likely.  A report 
for Government by Mott McDonald116 suggests that such changes would be limited, 
though this view is not shared by all distribution companies117.  It is possible that a large 
nuclear programme might reduce Government’s willingness to promote necessary 
network changes, though this is clearly a matter of uncertainty.  Microgeneration seems 
unlikely to become a major contributor to UK energy or electricity supply for many years, 
even in the most favourable circumstances, and its capacity to deliver significant carbon 
savings in average households is not yet proven118. 
4. Issues of inflexibility arising from the cumulative effect of nuclear investment and 
renewables investment: we noted earlier that nuclear powered generating plants tend to 
be relatively less flexible than other types of plants, particularly thermal plants.  To at 
least some degree, it is also true for most types of renewable plants currently seen in the 
UK that they lack the flexibility or predictability of thermal plants119.  This means that both 
nuclear plant and renewable plants can limit the system’s capability to follow load and, if 
                                               
115  As with a financial portfolio, there is benefit in diversity.  The maintenance of a nuclear component does not materially 
reduce the diversity value of renewables, whose risks are quite different from those of nuclear. The diversity benefit of 
nuclear power would be similar in type (though not necessarily scale) to that offered by renewables.  The particular 
advantage of both technologies from a system or portfolio perspective is that their costs, once plants are constructed, are 
largely fixed and their costs are largely uncorrelated with those of the dominant fossil fuel technologies.  See S. 
Awerbuch in Sussex Energy Group, op. cit. Annex B. 
116  Mott McDonald  System integration of additional micro-generation report to the DTI  2004 
117  Sussex Energy Group Response to EAC inquiry ‘Keeping the lights on’  2005 
118  Sussex Energy Group, op. cit.  
119  This is less the case with landfill gas, wastes, or biomass, but applies to wind and some hydro plants, which account for 
a major portion of total renewable capacity currently.  
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the combined proportion of nuclear and renewable plants increases very substantially, 
the position could arise where there would be insufficient flexibility in the system to 
match demand effectively at all points in the load curve, so reducing the value of 
renewable (and nuclear) sources.  Assessment of the significance of this issue again 
entails judgement.  But given the fact any credible new nuclear investment programme is 
likely to be well within the scale of the current nuclear capacity that is expected to be 
phased out over the next 15 years or so, any such adverse impact seems unlikely.   
Thus in terms of analysis of the public interest, there seems little reason to conclude that 
nuclear power will have a negative effect on government support for renewable sources.  
Whether it might nonetheless have an impact because of institutional or political pressures 
(or lack of time in the government’s policy agenda) is, again, a matter for judgement rather 
than detailed analysis.
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Appendix A. Discounting and the Cost of Capital 
Since the early 1960s it has been commonplace, in the public and private sectors, to use 
‘discounted cash flow’ techniques to compare expenditures or revenues over time.  This 
typically entails dividing £1 of cost or benefit in, say, year 10, by a factor (1+d)10, to convert it 
to a ‘present value’ in year 0, where d is the ‘discount rate’.  Or the discount rate may be 
used to convert a cost stream into a constant annual stream, like a mortgage repayment; or 
into an average unit cost of the associated output (such as p/kWh of electricity). 
In private sector appraisal, this discount rate is generally equated with the financial cost of 
capital for the investment in question.  In public sector welfare analysis in the UK it is 
generally equated with an estimate of ‘social time preference’ – that is a measure of how 
much society in general weights a future extra £1 of cost or benefit relative to a current £1.  
Appraisal of private sector investment is usually undertaken from the perspective of potential 
investors; or sometimes, by government or others, to assess the feasibility of a privately 
financed project.  Welfare analysis, in contrast, is generally undertaken to assess the public 
interest.  
In the 1960s and 1970s there was much debate in the UK about the comparative costs of 
nuclear and fossil fuelled electricity generation, in which the discount rate was seen as a 
major factor.  In those days both energy sources were supplied by nationalised industries, 
financed by public debt.  It is now fairly uncontentious in government that, in those 
circumstances, the appropriate rate would have been social time preference120, and that 
there was no need to take any separate account of the cost of capital (i.e. the cost of the 
public debt used to finance these investments).  However these circumstances no longer 
hold.  Future electricity generation will be privately financed.   
In this Appendix we address the relatively unusual issue of assessing the public interest for a 
privately promoted and mainly privately financed investment.  This includes factors which 
would not be covered by a commercial financial appraisal, including the possibility of very 
long term costs of waste disposal, which raises discounting issues of its own, and was not 
considered in the 1960s and 1970s. 
The handling of discounting and the cost of capital in comparing nuclear costs with other 
costs is thus more complicated than in earlier years.  It is further complicated by involving 
the traditions of financial economics, which does not usually recognise the concept of social 
time preference as separate from the financial cost of capital, and of welfare economics, 
which recognises social time preference, but sometimes (as in current UK Treasury 
guidance) does not recognise the financial cost of capital as a separate concept.  However 
this does not prevent wide areas of analysis on which most technical experts can agree. 
Two common sources of confusion we note for the record, as issues that need to be made 
clear in any analysis.  They are not especially prominent in the nuclear debate.  Nor are they 
generally sources of theoretical disagreement between experts, although expert views do 
diverge on how they are best handled in particular circumstances.   
                                               
120  Some financial economists would say that the rate should be the government borrowing rate plus a factor for the 
‘systematic risk’, or correlation with equity market yields, of the future cash flows, and an upward adjustment for 
corporation tax..  The government view for many years, with which we agree, has been that market rates are not a 
reliable indicator of society’s time preference.  
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One is the handling of general inflation, where many economists prefer to carry out analysis 
in ‘real terms’, while financial experts generally prefer figures in nominal, or cash terms, 
including a projection of future general inflation.  Real terms analysis is carried out at a 
constant price level, which requires interest rates to be expressed in real terms (which is 
broadly equal to the usual nominal terms, minus the expected rate of inflation).  Care should 
be taken to ensure that it is clear whether figures, in particular interest rates, costs of capital, 
or rates of return, are in real or nominal terms.121  
The other is taxation, where the usual convention, for analysis from a public interest 
perspective, is to express costs at pre-tax (i.e. tax-inclusive) market prices, but to beware of 
any features which might unduly distort comparisons.  Thus, for example, if a well defined 
and material tax (or subsidy) were applied to one source of supply, or one kind of financing, 
but not another, this should be allowed to affect the comparison only if it reflects the value of 
some external cost or benefit that applies to the one source but not the other.  
The long term costs of waste disposal may fall to the public sector.  If the capital and 
operating and maintenance costs can be identified they can be discounted (as the social 
time preference rate, perhaps at a decreasing rate over time) as a further social cost, subject 
to the comments below on the very long term.122 
Other important social externalities are the negative ones of risk of uncontrolled release of 
fission products from a reactor, the risk of exposure of future populations to significant 
radiation from waste, and the positive ones of national security of electricity supply and of 
greenhouse gas emissions.  Judgement on all of these factors needs, of course, to be 
informed by quantitative analysis, but we do not believe that explicit valuation by technical 
experts of a present value (or contribution to cost per kWh) of the radiation risks or impacts 
on security of supply would contribute to good policymaking.  These are issues where 
strategic judgements need to be made by the ultimate decision makers and wrapping up an 
uncertain part of these judgements in present values would detract from this.  In this view we 
are echoing a view widely expressed at a workshop of leading US academic experts on long 
term discounting.  One contributor, quoted with approval by the conference editors, 
suggested a common sense approach as follows to the issue of very long term costs or 
benefits:  
In a political decision setting, rather than simply calculating a net present 
value of benefits minus costs … the present value of the risk reduction costs 
to be borne by the current generation could be presented to decision-makers 
and the public, along with estimates of the ultimate effects (monetary and 
otherwise) of risk reduction in time and space.  Decision-makers and others 
then have to weigh whether the benefits justify the costs.  Toman (1999, p 34) 
The case against deriving present values of very long term impacts is strengthened by the 
confusion, especially severe in such contexts, between changes in monetary values over 
time (for example of environmental quality) and discounting simply to reflect time preference 
for marginal income.   
                                               
121  Care is also needed, of course, to ensure that any costs being compared are on the same price basis, for some specified 
date, such as “January 2005”. 
122  HM Treasury (2003)  specify a social time preference rate for the UK   This is currently 3.5% in real terms for periods 
of up to 30 years, decreasing to lower values for longer periods.   
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In contrast, the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions achieved by the nuclear plant over its 
lifetime should in principle be amenable to explicit valuation.  However the relevant monetary 
value – the opportunity cost, or opportunity value to the UK – is the saving it provides in 
other expenditures to meet the nation’s commitments to its own emissions target, however 
they may be set.  This may or may not be similar to figures derived for a “world “ value for 
the social cost of carbon. 
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Appendix B. Glossary of Terms 
  
ABWR Advanced Boiling Water Reactor – A further development of the 
boiling water reactor 
AGR Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor – A design commonly used in the UK 
BWR Boiling Water Reactor – the second most common world design, 
originally developed by General Electric 
CCGT Combined Cycle Gas Turbine – the dominant contemporary power 
technology as a result of its relatively low initial capital outlay 
EPR European Pressurised-water Reactor – a further development of the 
pressurised water reactor, currently under construction in Finland and 
under development in France 
FBR Fast Breeder Reactor – uses plutonium as a fuel. No commercial 
reactors of this kind operate anywhere in the world 
PBMR Pebble-Bed Modular Reactor – a small-scale reactor design promoted 
widely by industry, some way from being licensed or built 
PHWR Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor - most of these are Canadian 
CANDU reactors, though the Argentinean reactor is of different design 
PWR Pressurised Water Reactor – the most commonly used design in the 
world. There are several designs but those designed by, or derived 
from Westinghouse are the most common 
RBMK The Russian design of the Chernobyl type. No RBMK’s have been 
ordered since the Chernobyl accident, though Kursk (ordered before 
that date) is officially being completed 
WWER (VVER) A long-established Russian design of pressurised water reactor 
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